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Articles
Provisional Relief in Transnational Litigation
GEORGE A. BERMANN*

In this article,ProfessorBermann identifies andanalyzes the
principal problems raised by the rapidly growing
phenomenon of transnationalprovisionalrelief National
courts are facing serious challenges in organizing such
interventions, but as yet lack a sufficiently comprehensive
framework ofanalysis. The authorbegins with the clarifying
distinctionthatprovisionalreliefmay be transnationaleither
because of its significanteffects abroador because it lends
support to protective measures ordered by foreign courts,
and draws on the experiences of U.S. andforeign courts in
determining the costs of both granting and withholding
provisionalrelief He concludes that, despite the very real
riskof drawing objectionsfrom other countries, US. courts
shouldbe more receptive to requestsforprotectivemeasures
with extraterritorial effect when shown compelling
circumstancesfor granting them.
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INTRODUCTION

610
615

The recent growth of transnational litigation in the courts of all
countries has brought with it a heightened interest in issues of crossborder provisional relief. This is not surprising, given the importance
of provisional relief in litigation generally and its obvious applicability
to transnational litigation. As practitioners increasingly resort to
remedies of this sort, courts have been called upon to determine how
ready they are both to resort (or permit resort) to provisional relief from
foreign tribunals and to afford such relief in aid of foreign judicial
proceedings when asked to do so.
Transnational provisional relief is not, however, without its serious
theoretical and practical problems. Because its incidence has until
recently been fairly sporadic, neither courts nor commentators have
explored the problems of transnational provisional relief in all their
magnitude.) The purpose of this article is to identify what it is that
renders transnational provisional relief so problematic, to explore the

1. For the major exceptions, see Committee on International Civil and Commercial
Litigation, International Law Association, Second Interim Report on Provisional and Protective
Measures in International Litigation (Helsinki Conference 1996), and the works of the British
professor and lawyer, Lawrence Collins, cited therein and in notes 65, 98, and 126 infra.
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scenarios in which the issue most characteristically arises, and to
propose a policy framework by which courts may address the
multitudinous claims to transnational provisional relief that are
inevitably coming their way.
This is not to say that courts in the U.S., or other countries for that
matter, have been inattentive in general to their interactions with foreign
courts. Some judicial interactions occur more or less routinely, and
national legal systems have tended to respond to these interactions with
more or less conventional solutions; in the U.S., these solutions
sometimes may be found in treaties or in statutes (typically, though not
invariably, federal). Service of process abroad is a good example, for
both the United States Code2 and the Hague Service Convention3 (to
which the United States is a party) address that issue with some
specificity. The same may be said about cooperation in making
evidence from U.S. sources available for use in litigation abroad, and
vice versa. As to recognition and enforcement of foreign country
judgments, another perennial "inter-jurisdictional" issue, state rather
than federal legislation plays the dominant role.'
Other recurring inter-jurisdictional problems have traditionally
been left for the courts themselves to solve. These include questions of
whether and to what extent courts should decline to exercise their
statutory jurisdiction in deference to the parties' prior designation of a
foreign court as the exclusive forum,6 in deference to an arbitration
agreement,' in deference to the greater convenience of litigation abroad,'
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1696 (1994) (permitting district court to "order service ... of any
document issued in connection with a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal"). See
also FED. R. CIv. P. 4(f) (permitting service upon individuals in a foreign country).
3. See Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in
Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163.
4. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1781-82 (1994) (discussing evidence gathering in the United States
in aid of foreign or international tribunals); FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b) (prescribing conditions for
depositions in foreign countries); FED. R. Civ. P. 29 (permitting parties to stipulate to discovery
(including depositions) overseas).
5. See, e.g., Biel v. Boehm, 406 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (foreign judgment
must satisfy relevant Nev York statutory provisions to be recognized (See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 530203 (McKinney 1997)) and then enforced (See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5401-02 (McKinney 1997)) in
New York).
Some legislative guidance is offered by the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act, which provides that a foreign monetary judgment entitled to recognition in
a state is enforceable "in the same manner as the judgment of a sister state which is entitled to
full faith and credit." See UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JuDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3 (1962).
6. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972).
7. See generally Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506 (1994).
8. See generally Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); In re Union Carbide
Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
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or in deference to the pendency abroad of an action on the same or a
related dispute.' Similarly left for judicial policymaking is the question
of when, if ever, a court may issue an anti-suit injunction to prevent
someone over whom the court has jurisdiction from bringing or
maintaining an action in the courts of another country.'
The fact remains that, as a general phenomenon, transnational
provisional relief is far less well defined than the more conventional
sorts of judicial interventions (or non-interventions) that I have just
identified. Serving process or obtaining evidence abroad, recognizing
or enforcing foreign judgments, and declining the exercise of
jurisdiction on the grounds mentioned are all, in themselves, relatively
definite and discrete operations. For all the controversy surrounding it,
even the international anti-suit injunction is a reasonably clear form of
intervention with reasonably clear consequences. By comparison, the
notion of provisional relief is much less well defined and its
consequences much more difficult to gauge. If this is so when issues of
provisional relief arise in domestic litigation (as I believe it is), it is all
the more so when they are introduced into the necessarily more
turbulent waters of transnational litigation.
Lack of definition, however, is only part of the problem.
Transnational provisional relief presents other complexities as well.
First of all, such relief is sometimes sought principally by a party and
sometimes by a court itself. Understandably, the identity of the
requesting party may affect the way in which a court evaluates a request
for relief addressed to it. This particular complexity seldom arises in
connection with requests for transnational service of process or for the
other, more conventional judicial interventions mentioned above. At
least in U.S. courts, such conventional requests are apt to be uniformly
understood (or at least treated) as essentially party-driven rather than
court-driven, and evaluated in those terms. But U.S. courts may truly
not appreciate the extent to which a request for provisional relief in aid
of foreign litigation actually has the blessing of the foreign court in
question. And even if a request is not expressly couched in terms of the
interests of the foreign forum, the response of a U.S. court will
inevitably affect the foreign proceedings in important ways. Under
these circumstances, the U.S. court cannot, or at least should not, make
9. See generally Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, 604 F. Supp. 280
(D.D.C. 1984) (court had previously shown deference and patience during pendency of English
proceedings; following House of Lords decision to show deference to U.S. proceedings, court
declared itself to be the only forum of competent jurisdiction).
10. See George A. Bermann, The Use ofAnti-Suit Injunctionsin InternationalLitigation,

28 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 501, 589 (1990).
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its willingness to intervene depend solely (as is typically the case in the
other scenarios mentioned above) on its own interests or on the interests
of the parties to the foreign proceeding.
Second, it may also be necessary in cases of transnational
provisional relief to distinguish between situations in which a party to
foreign litigation seeks relief from a U.S. court and situations in which
a foreign court issues its own order of relief and the U.S. court is merely
asked (typically by the party in whose favor it was granted) to "enforce"
it. The U.S. court may want to treat these situations differently,
precisely because in the latter case the foreign court has issued its
decree; surely international comity carries greater weight when the
foreign court has actually spoken.
Third, discussion of transnational provisional relief often entails
some confusion between two distinct questions: whether the court that
is asked to intervene by way of provisional relief hasjurisdictionto
entertain such a request; and whether the application makes out a
sufficient case on the merits for granting that relief Confusion between
jurisdiction and merits is much less likely to arise in connection with the
more usual forms of international judicial intervention. For example,
a court may not even need an independent jurisdictional basis to
perform service of documents on a party, though it is very likely to have
one. Similarly, a court does not necessarily have to invoke a
jurisdictional basis in order to assist a foreign court in the production of
evidence-though it certainly will need one in order to compel
production. Theoretically, a court may look for ajurisdictional basis to
justify enforcing a foreign country judgment, but in practice it will
consider the mere presence of assets to be a satisfactory basis. And it
goes without saying that, when a court declines jurisdiction in deference
to the parties' prior selection of a foreign forum, or for some other
reason, it does not first have to establish a basis ofjurisdiction for doing
so-though once again, it needs jurisdiction in order to take the further
step of compelling a party to submit to the jurisdiction of a foreign court
or international arbitral tribunal. In contrast to all of these situations,
requests for provisional relief seem to invite both ajurisdictional inquiry
and (if the result is positive) a determination of the claim for relief on
the merits. The distinction between the two may often be difficult to
trace, but it is not without significance.
All of these considerations help make the subject of transnational
provisional relief a problematic one. The intellectual and practical
problems of such relief have not, however, dissuaded parties from
requesting it or prevented courts from sometimes raising the prospect on
their own motion. As a result, these problems are arising, often enough
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with some urgency. In this article, I seek to contribute to their proper
analysis.
In Part II of this article, I consider provisional relief that is
transnational by virtue of the significant effects it has on persons,
property, or conduct located abroad. I begin by defining the principal
scenarios that generate claims to transnational provisional relief of this
sort and the forms that such relief is likely to take. My purpose is to
identify the specific problems that these scenarios and these forms of
relief typically entail, and to suggest how courts may best cope with
them. In Part III, I consider a related but distinct aspect of transnational
provisional relief: the readiness of courts of country Y to lend their
support to protective measures that a court of country X has ordered in
an action pending before it, at the request of either the country X court
or a party to the country X action. This facet of the subject is no less
complex. Among the problems apt to arise in both situations are the
anticipated and, in some cases, the real objections of other countries.
This is the subject of Part IV.
Not surprisingly, I conclude that transnational provisional relief is
both an imperative of, and a potential threat to, contemporary
international litigation. Absent more comprehensive international
agreements than now exist, national courts have no choice but to weigh
carefully the costs associated both with granting and withholding relief.
In my judgment, U.S. courts (like U.K. courts) are on the right track in
entertaining requests for protective measures with extraterritorial effect,
and in granting them on occasion when shown compelling
circumstances for doing so. On the other hand, the few U.S. courts that
have addressed the question of enforcing foreign court orders of
provisional relief have thus far adopted too restrictive an attitude toward
it. It is to be hoped that this is mostly a product of the relative novelty
of this scenario, and that further experience and reflection will yield a
more nuanced and more basically positive judicial response.
II.

THE TRANSNATIONAL EFFECTS OF PROVISIONAL RELIEF

The aims of provisional relief are essentially the same whether the
need arises in transnational or in purely domestic litigation. Perhaps its
principal purpose is to ensure that assets within the jurisdiction of the
court will remain available for satisfaction of an eventual money
judgment. It is easy enough to place this need in a transnational context
by imagining, in a case brought by party A against party B in country
X, that the assets of party B located in country Y will be needed, to
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satisfy an eventual judgment, and that those assets are at risk of
disappearance.
In a sense, the pre-judgment attachment of assets as security
merely illustrates a broader purpose of provisional relief, namely to help
preserve the statusquo pending litigation. But preserving the statusquo
clearly may mean other things as well, such as protecting the subject
matter of the dispute or preventing further harm while the litigation is
underway. Here, too, transnational applications of provisional relief are
easily imagined, as when the subject matter of the dispute before the
courts of country X is physically present in country Y and there is
reason to fear for its survival.
Put in still broader terms, provisional relief may be thought of
simply as a means of enhancing in some fashion the effectiveness of
pending litigation. Provisional relief typically is sought from the same
court as the one in which the litigation whose efficacy is in question is
pending, but that will not necessarily be the case; it may well be sought
to enhance the effectiveness of litigation pending elsewhere.
Provisional relief becomes truly transnational when the two courts in
question belong to two independent States. In no field have U.S. courts
more fully explored the potential value of transnational provisional
relief than bankruptcy. The lessons learned in the bankruptcy field may
be particularly instructive in determining whether transnational
provisional relief should be made more widely available in other fields.
In this section, I treat each of these scenarios in turn. I focus in
each case on a situation in which the principal action is pending in a
court of the United States and the provisional relief that is contemplated
is in some sense extraterritorial-that is, furnished abroad. The
prospect of transnational provisional relief is somewhat different in each
of these scenarios, and so are the problems that it generates.
A.

SecuringSatisfaction of a FutureJudgment

This section discusses the prospect of attaching in country Y the
assets of party B, whom party A has sued in country X, due to the risk
that B will dispose of the assets needed to satisfy a potential country X
judgment. If other countries did not generally recognize this risk as
sufficient to justify an award of provisional relief in the form of
attachment or of an injunction against the dissipation of assets in
domestic litigation, the prospects for transnational relief of this sort
might well be dim. But provisional relief to secure satisfaction of a
future judgment is hardly unique to the United States; the laws of other
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countries provide a similar remedy, albeit sometimes in a different form.
U.K. courts, for example, have asserted the right to issue orders
enjoining persons from removing or disposing of their assets--orders
whose disobedience the courts can presumably punish in the same way
that they punish disobedience of court orders generally. This particular
remedy bears the name of a Mareva injunction, after the 1975 decision
in which the House of Lords established it." The remedy has since been
codified by statute. 2
There are different ways in which attachments to secure
satisfaction of a future judgment can assume transnational dimensions.
Since these ways differ significantly, each needs to be analyzed
separately. While some will prove relatively simple, others will prove
to be problematic.
1.

Attaching Domestic Assets of Non-National Parties

It is much too late in the day to suppose that a U.S. court's
willingness to grant provisional relief will depend simply on the
nationality of the parties to the litigation. More specifically, neither the
nationality of the applicant nor of the respondent has any bearing on the
availability of such relief. In what appears to be the only U.S. case even
to raise the possibility that the nationality of the applicant might matter,
the court assumed this to be a factor of no importance. 3 As to the
11. See Mareva CompaniaNaviera S.A. v. Int'l Bulkcarriers S.A., [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep.
509 (C.A. 1975). According to the opinion of Lord Denning in that case, "If it appears that [a]
debt is due and owing-and there is a danger that the debtor may dispose of his assets so as to
defeat it before judgment-the Court has jurisdiction in a proper case to grant an interlocutory
judgment so as to prevent him disposing of those assets." Id. at 510. For further elaboration
of the contours of the Mareva injunction, see the Court of Appeal opinions in Third Chandris
Shipping Corp. v. UnimarineS.A. (The Pythia, The Angelic Wings, The Genie), [1979] 2 All
E.R. 972 (Q.B. 1979).
12. See The Supreme Court Act, 1981, ch. 54, § 37(3) (Eng.). The court may buttress a
Mareva injunction with an order to the defendant to disclose the existence, amount, and
location of the assets. See A. v. C., [1981] 1 Q.B. 956; A.J. Bekhor & Co. v. Bilton, [1981] 1
Q.B. 923 (Eng. C.A.); Derby & Co. v. Weldon (Nos. 3 & 4), [1990] Ch. 65 (Eng. C.A.); Bank
of Crete S.A. v. Koskotas, [1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 587 (Eng. C.A.); House of Spring Gardens
Ltd. v. Waite, [1984] F.S.R. 277 (Ch. 1983). The U.K. courts have issued disclosure orders of
this sort to third parties, typically banks, holding assets in account for the defendant. See
Bankers Trust Co. v. Shapira, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1274 (Eng. C.A.). Similarly, American courts
often couple attachment orders with orders to disclose the existence and value of other assets.
See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 n.11 (1976); Federal Trade Comm'n v. H. N.
Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir. 1982).
13. "[W]hile the damaged parties are German Nationals who may have some remedies in
their native country, this Court will operate under the same equity principles with respect to
them as it does with respect to American citizens." USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy,
Inc., 539 F. Supp. 807, 814 (W.D. Ky. 1982).
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possible immunity of non-national defendants from prejudgment
attachment of property, the question seems never to have been raised.
The U.S. assets of non-U.S. nationals have commonly been attached for
purposes of securing an eventual judgment. 4 This does not necessarily
mean, of course, that a court is free to attach property within its
jurisdiction without regard to whether the property owner has sufficient
contacts with the jurisdiction for due process purposes. On the contrary,
the case of Shaffer v. Heitner 5 stands for the proposition that even
assertions of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction require "minimum contacts"
within the meaning of InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington.6 The
Shaffer case, of course, involved an assertion of quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction for purposes of obtaining jurisdiction over the defendant to
adjudicate the merits of the case, and not merely for purposes of
securing satisfaction of a future judgment. In fact, the Court in Shaffer
held out the possibility of a "security" exception to the requirement of
minimum contacts in quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, remarking in dictum
that a plaintiff might be entitled, without demonstrating minimum
contacts of any kind, to attach property located in one state "as security
for ajudgment being sought in [another] forum where the litigation can
be maintained consistently with [the] InternationalShoe [case]."' 7
In reliance on this language, some courts have asserted jurisdiction
for pre-judgment attachment purposes based on nothing more than the
presence within the jurisdiction of the assets to be attached. 8 This does

14. See, e.g, Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028, 1029 (2d Cir.
1990); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1258-60 (7th Cir. 1980); Cameco Indus.,
Inc. v. Mayatrac, S.A., 789 F. Supp. 200, 202 (D. Md. 1992).
The case for awarding provisional relief in a proper case is stronger, of course, where
the addressee is a U.S. national who is merely resident overseas. See United States v. Shaheen,
445 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1971). In that case, the government's request for an order forbidding
a taxpayer from leaving the jurisdiction was granted by the lower court on the ground that the
taxpayer's presence was necessary to enforce an order requiring him to repatriate assets then
located in Europe. The taxpayer was a U.S. national who had taken up residence abroad, but
had briefly returned to the U.S. for the limited purpose of defending a criminal action against
him. Though the Court of Appeals vacated the injunction as unnecessary, it sav no reason why
it could not be issued to a non-resident.
In InternationalControls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334, 1338 (2d Cir. 1974), the
court permitted attachment for security purposes of a vessel of Panamanian registry owned by
a Panamanian company, where the vessel was undergoing repairs at a Miami dry dock. It may
have been decisive that the Panamanian company was found to have "performed no function
other than that of a mere nominee or shell" of the principal defendant, Vesco, over whom the
court indubitably had personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1355.
15. See 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977).
16. See 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
17. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at210.
18. See Barclay's Bank, S.A. v. Tsakos, 543 A.2d 802, 805 (D.C. 1988).
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not seem at all unreasonable. U.S. courts are not deemed to violate due
process when they enforce a foreign country judgment against a
judgment debtor who has no contacts with the forum other than
ownership of local property that can be used to satisfy the foreign
judgment. 9 If that is so, there is no reason why the presence of local
assets belonging to a party cannot also support a pre-judgment
attachment to secure payment of an eventual judgment against the
property owner, provided of course that the usual criteria for the award
of provisional relief are met and the attachment is otherwise proper.
2.

"Attaching" Foreign Assets

Far more interesting is the question of whether, in anticipation of
ajudgment in its favor, a claimant may have recourse to its opponent's
assets abroadfor purposes of securing satisfaction of that judgment.
Strictly speaking, of course, a court cannot attach assets of the defendant
that are not located within the court's jurisdiction. 20 Assuming the
defendant is itself "present," however, the court does have the power to
issue an injunction prohibiting it from disposing of foreign assets.2 '

19. See Biel v.Boehm, 406 N.Y.S.2d 231, 234-35 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (extending the Shaffer
court's quasi-in-rem "security for ajudgment" exception to foreign country judgments).
20. See Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, N.V.v. Sentry Corp., 163 F. Supp. 800,803
(E.D. Pa. 1958).
21. See United States v. Ross, 302 F.2d 831, 834 (2d Cir. 1962). In this action to subject
a taxpayer's property to jeopardy assessments for unpaid income taxes, the district court issued
an order forbidding the transfer of the taxpayer's property, appointing a receiver, and directing
the taxpayer to deliver shares of stock to the receiver. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding
that the taxpayer's failure to file income tax returns for two years or to pay income taxes for
four years, and his transfer of a large volume of assets out of the jurisdiction, justified this order
of relief:
The court had personal jurisdiction over Ross, acquired by personal service
of summons on his authorized agent. Personal jurisdiction gave the court
power to order Ross to transfer property whether that property was within
or without the limits of the court's territorial jurisdiction ....
The action of the District Court in ordering appellant over whom it had
jurisdiction to do an act in a foreign country does not per se involve any
invasion of the sovereignty of that country ....Of course no court should
order the performance of an act in a foreign country when that act will
violate the foreign country's laws.
Id. at 834 (citations omitted).
See also In re Feit & Drexler, 760 F.2d 406, 415 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[i]n the present case,
there is no question that the district court had personal jurisdiction over [the owner of the
property]. Accordingly, the district court had the power to order [her] to transfer her property
to [an] escrow agent regardless of where that property was located"); In re Guyana Dev. Corp.,
189 B.R. 393, 396 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (construing 26 U.S.C. § 6321, creating a lien in favor of
the U.S. upon "all property and rights to property" belonging to a tax delinquent, as reaching
all of the latter's property, both foreign and domestic, and refusing to be influenced by the
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While not an attachment as such, an order of this kind may well produce
the same practical effect.
The mere fact that the assets in question are located abroad renders
the relief transnational in an important respect. 22 One can imagine that,
faced with this situation, a court (of country X) will exercise a greater
than usual degree of caution in entertaining applications for provisional
relief. Not only does such an order interfere with property physically
located within the jurisdiction of a foreign state (country Y), and thus
operate in a sense extraterritorially, but the court of country X by
definition lacks direct means of enforcement against the property in the
event that its order is not obeyed. The difficulty may become apparent
if and when the court of country X finds it necessary to enlist the
cooperation of the authorities of country Y. Winning recognition of the
injunction in country Y-and, moreover, getting it enforced in an
appropriate fashion by the authorities of country Y-may be
problematic. Indeed, the court of country X may hesitate to issue the
order in the first place precisely because it anticipates that the
authorities of country Y will withhold their cooperation.
The leading American case is Republic of the Philippines v.

prospect that such a lien may not be enforceable in the foreign jurisdiction).
22. The question of whether a court should award provisional relief in the form of an
attachment of extraterritorial assets is to be distinguished from the question of whether a court
should exercise jurisdiction over an action on the merits concerning those assets. The latter
question arose in Islamic Republic ofIran v. Pahlavi,464 N.Y.S.2d 487 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
There, a New York appeals court upheld a dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds of an
action by the Government of Iran asking a New York court to impress a constructive trust on
the worldwide assets of the former Shah and his wife on account of his misuse of powers. The
court regarded the cause of action as insufficiently related to New York:
Although the list of assets does include some assets with a relation to New
York, this is not a case of a dispute as to the ownership of specific property
in this state. The complaint asks to impress a constructive trust on assets of
the defendants throughout the world; it asks for an accounting of all monies
and property of any kind received by the defendants from the Government
of Iran, together with all profits derived therefrom .... This is plainly a
transitory action arising in Iran ....
[T]he fact that plaintiff chose to bring its suit in New York, rather than
in one of the other jurisdictions where the Shah sojourned after his flight,
[should not] force us to accept the burden of that suit.
New York will have fully discharged its limited responsibility to
provide a system ofjustice applicable to the dispute between plaintiff and its
former rulers if New York courts are available for the determination of
disputed claims to the ownership of specific property having a situs in New
York. That is not this case.
Id. at 490-91. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court decision in a ruling that made it
clear thatforum non conveniens dismissal may be proper even in situations where there is no
alternative forum abroad. See Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 467 N.E.2d 245, 249 (N.Y.
1984).
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Marcos.23 This was a suit by the Republic of the Philippines against its
former president, his wife, and others. The suit involved a claim under
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, and
pendent state law claims, arising out of the defendants' investment in
the U.S. of fraudulently obtained moneys. The plaintiff petitioned the
district court for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants
from disposing of any of their assets, except as needed to pay their
attorneys' fees and meet their normal living expenses. 24 Those assets
included real property and other assets of the Marcoses located not only
in the U.S., but also in the U.K. and Switzerland. The district court's
order issuing the injunction, which had been vacated by a panel of the
Court of Appeals, was reinstated by the Court of Appeals sitting en
banc. The court ruled that the district court had not abused its discretion
in granting the injunction. After finding that the plaintiff had shown a
sufficient probability of success on the merits and a sufficient likelihood
of irreparable injury, and that the balance of hardships tipped sharply in
the plaintiff's favor, the court turned to the "extraterritoriality" issue:
The injunction is directed against individuals, not against
property; it enjoins the Marcoses and their associates from
transferring certain assets wherever they are located. Because
the injunction operates in personam, not in rem, 25there is no
reason to be concerned about its territorial reach.
In a related case, the Ninth Circuit upheld a district court order
temporarily enjoining the Marcos estate from transferring, secreting, or
dissipating the estate's assets. That injunction was to remain in effect
during the pendency in the district court of a damage action against the
estate by families of victims of alleged torture, summary execution, and
disappearance. Citing the estate's pattern of secreting and dissipating
assets to avoid satisfying court judgments, the court concluded that
money damages would not be an adequate remedy. Its order thus barred
the estate from transferring any of its assets, including $320 million held

23. 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988).
24. The Court of Appeals found that the freeze order was not an attachment (and therefore
not dependent under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64 on state law, in this case California
law), but rather an injunction, and thus within the court's inherent equitable powers to preserve
the status quo. See id. at 1361.
25. Id. at 1363-64. The Court relied on Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 289
(1952). For indirect criticism of the court's determination in Marcos that sufficient predicate
conduct took place in the U.S. to support application of the RICO Act, see Alfadda v. Fenn, 751
F. Supp. 1114, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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in Swiss and Hong Kong banks.26
The Marcos decisions were not without precedent. In 1965, in an
action by the United States against a Uruguayan corporation for $19
million in income taxes owed, the Supreme Court sustained a federal
court order enjoining a New York bank from transferring any assets of
the corporation held in the bank's Montevideo branch. Deeming the
branch to be within the court's jurisdiction on account of the close
control exercised over it by the New York office, the Supreme Court
concluded that "[o]nce personal jurisdiction of a party is obtained, the
District Court has authority to order it to 'freeze' property under its
control, whether the property be within or without the United States. 27
Justice Douglas' only apparent reservation was over the propriety of
considering the home and branch offices of the bank as a single entity
for these purposes.28 In fact, in none of the many cases in which U.S.
courts have been asked to restrict a party's use of overseas assets has a

26. See In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1480 (9th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995).
In addition to satisfying the requisite substantive standards for provisional relief, an
order for the pre-judgment attachment of assets (or other similar injunctive remedy) may have
to meet procedural due process requirements. In a criminal case arising out of the prosecution
of the Panamanian ruler Manuel Noriega for international drug trafficking, a federal court held
that the government deprived Noriega of his due process rights by persuading certain foreign
countries to freeze temporarily millions of dollars in bank accounts without first conducting an
adversarial hearing in which he could refute the charge that the assets in question were linked
to drug trafficking. It held that he could not, in any event, be deprived of access to those assets
needed to pay his attorney fees unless and until the assets were shown in fact to be connected
with illegal activity. See United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1541, 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
Another relevant case is Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 2 (1991). In that case, the United
States Supreme Court ruled that a state statute authorizing pre-judgment attachment of real
estate without prior notice or hearing, and without requiring a showing of exigent
circumstances, runs afoul of the requirements of due process.
27. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 384-85 (1965). "If such relief
were beyond the authority of the District Court, foreign taxpayers facing jeopardy assessments
might either transfer assets abroad or dissipate those in foreign accounts under control of
American institutions before personal service on the foreign taxpayer could be made. Such a
scheme was underfoot here, the affidavits aver." Id. at 385.
28. That is not to say that a federal court in this country should treat all the
affairs of a branch bank the same as it would those of the home office. For
overseas transactions are often caught in a web of extraterritorial activities
and foreign law beyond the ken of our federal courts or their competence.
We have, however, no such involvement here, for there is no showing that
the mere "freezing" of the Montevideo accounts, pending service on [the
taxpayer], would violate foreign law (citation omitted) or place [the bank]
under any risk of double liability (citation omitted). The District Court
reserved power to enter any protective order of that character (citation
omitted). And if... the litigation might in time be embarrassing to United
States diplomacy, the District Court remains open to the Executive Branch.
Id. at 384-85.
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court treated the "extraterritorial" character of the restraint as a salient
factor.29 Even when they ultimately deny injunctive relief of this sort,
courts do not apparently lay much emphasis on the fact (if such is
indeed the case) that the property is located in another jurisdiction."
On occasion, litigants have urged that courts refrain from issuing
orders restraining the use of property located abroad in the absence of
available sanctions in the event such orders are disregarded." In my
judgment, it is unwise for courts to refrain from issuing otherwise
appropriate orders to a person within the jurisdiction merely because
they anticipate resistance on the part of the addressee and/or an
unwillingness on the part of the foreign authorities to compel obedience.
The better course would be for the court to issue the order that the
circumstances suggest, hoping that a foreign court will lend the
appropriate assistance. If such assistance is not forthcoming, the court
should then consider issuing its own contempt order enforceable by fie
or arrest.32 It is true that, at the present time, the U.S. is a party to very

29. See Reebok Int'l, Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., Inc., 970 F. 2d 552, 556 (9th Cir. 1992)
(court has inherent equitable power to prohibit a party from transferring its assets; this power
is ancillary to its authority to provide final equitable relief for the sale of counterfeit goods
under the Lanham Act); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. International Swiss Invs. Corp., 895
F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1990) (courts have equitable powers to require foreign defendants
to perform or refrain from performing acts overseas, including an accounting to identify assets
subject to disgorgement under the securities laws); In re Feit & Drexler, Inc., 760 F.2d 406, 416
(2d Cir. 1985) (bankruptcy trustee is entitled to injunctive relief prohibiting former owner of
debtor corporation from disposing of assets in Swiss bank accounts); Fleming v. Gray Mfg. Co.,
352 F. Supp. 724, 726 (D. Conn. 1973) (injunctive relief may be granted to give plaintiffs
control over defendants' securities in order to ensure the availability of assets to satisfy a
judgment, even when the securities are outside the jurisdiction); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 53 (1971).
30. See Chemical Bank v. Haseotes, 13 F.3d 569, 573 (2d Cir. 1994); Hoxworth v.
Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 197 (3d Cir. 1990). In Hoxworth, the court suggested
that the location of the property was in fact irrelevant: "We assume that the district court
intended to prohibit the transfer of funds from a location inside the United States to a location
outside the United States, although the paragraph could be read alternatively as prohibiting the
transfer of funds located outside the United States. Resolving this ambiguity is not critical to
our disposition of the present appeal, but the district court might wish to clarify its language in
any order it might issue during future stages of the litigation." 903 F.2d at 193-94, n.10.
31. See infra text accompanying note 50.
32. See InternationalSwiss Invs. Corp., 895 F.2d at 1277. In the Ross case, the court
likewise dismissed the argument that the addressee of the order was outside the court's
jurisdiction for enforcement purposes:
Appellant urges that the orders of the court are brutumfulmen because Ross
is a resident of the Bahamas against whom enforcement powers are not
available. One is tempted to inquire why, if the orders are ineffectual, the
appellant is making such strenuous efforts to get them reversed. But in any
event the argument that an order is an abuse of discretion because the party
to whom the order is directed may refuse to obey it, is quite unappealing.
302 F.2d at 834. The court left open the question of whether similar orders might be directed
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few mutual cooperation agreements with other countries, and that the
prospects of compelling cooperation by foreign authorities may thus not
be great. Experience with such agreements as do exist is, however,
favorable. For example, on the basis of a cooperation treaty with the
U.K,33 a federal court hearing a civil forfeiture action asserted authority
to reach the overseas assets of a non-U.S. national. According to the
court, the demonstrated cooperation of the U.K. authorities under the
treaty permitted the conclusion that the U.S. court had constructive
control over the overseas funds necessary to support in rem jurisdiction,
whether or not it had in personam jurisdiction over the Colombian
nationals and residents who owned the property.34
No American decision to date, however, approaches the U.K. case
of Derby & Co. Ltd. v. Weldon35 in its extensive treatment, and
enthusiastic embrace, of the extraterritorial freeze of assets. In June
1987, Derby and other members of a U.S. banking group brought suit
against two U.K. nationals (as well as two companies, one Panamanian
and one Luxembourg) for breach of contract, negligence, breach of
fiduciary duty, deceit, and conspiracy to defraud. In December of that
year, the plaintiffs sought exparte orders from the Chancery Division
restraining the individual defendants from removing assets from certain
of the jurisdictions-France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, Ireland,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and the U.K.-in which they were located.
They also applied for orders restraining the individual defendants from
disposing of any of those assets, except insofar as they exceeded £25
million in value. Having won those orders, the plaintiffs then sought to
have them both extended until the time ofjudgment in the main action
and broadened to cover all assets of the defendants, wherever located.
In addition, the plaintiffs asked the court to order the defendants to
disclose the location and value of all their assets.
to persons who, though in privity with Ross, were outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
For discussion of the problem of enforcing orders that compel action outside the
jurisdiction, see generally Ernest J. Messner, The Jurisdictionof a Courtof Equity over Persons
to Compel the Doing ofActs Outside the TerritorialLimits of the State, 14 MINN. L. REv. 494
(1930). Messner concludes that U.S. courts commonly issue orders requiring parties before the
court to perform acts outside the court's territorial jurisdiction. Id. at 528.
33. See Agreement Concerning the Investigation of Drug Trafficking Offences and the
Seizure and Forfeiture of Proceeds and Instrumentalities of Drug Trafficking, Feb. 9, 1988,
U.S.-U.K., art. 10, T.I.A.S. No. 11,649. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
34. See United States v. All Funds on Deposit in any Accounts Maintained in the Names
of Meza or De Castro, 63 F.3d 148, 153-54 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1541 (1996).
The lower court opinion is reported at 856 F. Supp. 759 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). See also United
States v. One Caribou Aircraft Registration No. N-0 17-H, 557 F. Supp. 379, 380-81 (D.P.R.

1983).
35. Derby & Co. Ltd. v. Weldon, [1990] 1 Ch. 48, 55, 65 (Eng. C.A.).
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The Chancery Division found that the plaintiffs had made a "good
arguable case" and had established a sufficient risk that the defendants
might dispose of their assets before judgment to justify continuation of
the protective order until the time of judgment. The court noted that
while Mareva orders previously had been limited to assets located
within the jurisdiction,36 there was no reason in principle why, in a
proper case, such orders could not be issued with respect to assets
located overseas. On the other hand, the court declined to.make this
particular order fully world-wide (or to require disclosure of the
defendants' world-wide assets), citing the burdensomeness to the
defendants of an order of that scope 37 and the absence of proof of
dishonesty on the defendants' part.38
On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed this last aspect of the
Chancery Division's decision. While conceding that a world-wide
injunction (and the ancillary disclosure order) was a "drastic" and
potentially "oppressive" remedy that should only be granted in
exceptional circumstances, it nevertheless found such circumstances to
be present. Essentially, it determined that the defendants' assets in the
U.K. were wholly insufficient to satisfy a prospective judgment, and
that there was a high risk that the defendants would dispose of their
substantial foreign assets in anticipation of an adverse judgment.
Apparently, the evidence "of previous malpractice or nefarious intent '"
on the defendants' part was critical for Lord Justice May.
Acknowledging that the Marevajurisdiction "is a developing one," he
nevertheless concluded that "this case... is one which cries out for a
[pre-judgment] worldwide Mareva injunction.... 4 o
The other judges, though concurring in the result, were no less
cautious in their attitude toward the remedy. Nicholls, L.J., said:
An order restraining a defendant from dealing with any of his
assets overseas, and requiring him to disclose details of all
his assets wherever located, is a draconian order. The risk of
prejudice to which, in the absence of such an order, the

36. The court relied for this proposition on the Court of Appeal decision in Ashtiani v.
Kashi, [1986] 2 All E.R. 970 (Eng. C.A.).
37. "The oppression will still be very severe because the respondents, while preparing
for a very complicated trial in England, may at the same time find themselves engaged in courts
overseas in applications of a Mareva nature; bearing in mind that the plaintiffs with all their
resources may not be slow to seek to engage the respondents in as many courts as possible."
Judgment by Mervyn Davies, J., of June 20, 1988, [1989] E.C.C. 273, 280 (Ch.).
38. See id.
39. Derby, [1990] 1 Ch. at 55.
40. Id. at 54.
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plaintiff will be subject is that of the dissipation or secretion
of assets abroad. This risk must, on the facts, be
appropriately grave before it will be just and convenient for
such a draconian order to be made. It goes without saying
that before such an order is made the court will scrutinise the
facts with particular care ....I do not think that it is correct
that, if an order is made in the present case regarding
overseas assets, such an order will become, or should
become, the norm in cases where a restraint order is made
regarding assets within the jurisdiction.4'
Parker, L.J., added that a world-wide Mareva injunction would clearly
be unjustified if there were sufficient English assets to cover the
judgment in question, if there was no real risk of the foreign assets
being disposed of, or if such an order "would in all the circumstances be
oppressive."4 He found none of those circumstances to be present. On
the other hand, to mitigate the harshness of the remedy, the court
conditioned its grant on the plaintiffs' undertaking neither to apply to a
foreign court to enforce the order against the individual defendants, nor
to use any information disclosed by the defendants about their overseas
assets, without first obtaining the English court's permission.43
Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs sought similar world-wide
injunctions and ancillary disclosure orders against the Panamanian and
Luxembourg corporate defendants. The trial court ordered those
remedies and appointed a receiver of assets of the Luxembourg
company (CMI), but not of the Panamanian one (Milco). CMI appealed
the orders addressed to it, and the plaintiffs appealed the court's refusal
to issue such orders against Milco. In the Court of Appeal,44 CMI
argued that, even conceding (1) that the individual defendants were
likely to dissipate their own assets prior to judgment, (2) that they
exercised a high degree of control over CMI and Milco, (3) that CMI
and Milco could be found liable at trial in respect to the claims in the
case, and (4) that both CMI and Milco might dissipate their own assets
as well, a world-wide injunction should nevertheless not issue against
it because it (unlike the individual defendants) had no assets whatsoever
within the jurisdiction of the court. CMI also argued that it was
improper for the court to appoint a receiver for assets outside its

41. Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 56.
43. To the same effect, see Tate Access Floors Inc. v. Boswell, [1990] 3 All E.R. 303,
310-11 (Ch.).
44. Derby & Co. Ltd v. Weldon (Nos. 3 & 4), [1990] 1 Ch. 65 (Eng. C.A.).
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jurisdiction.
In upholding the CMI orders, Lord Donaldson reaffirmed that
"[tihe normal form of order should indeed be confined to assets within
the jurisdiction ... [since] ... most defendants operate nationally
rather than internationally."45 "But, once the court is concerned with an
international operator, the position may well be different." He
continued:
[T]he key requirement for any Mareva injunction, whether or
not it extends to foreign assets, is that it shall accord with the
rationale upon which Mareva relief has been based in the
past. That rationale... [is] that no court should permit a
defendant to take action designed to frustrate subsequent
orders of the court. If for the achievement of this purpose it
is necessary to make orders concerning foreign assets, such
orders should be made, subject, of course, to ordinary
principles of international law.46
As to CMI's specific claim that a U.K. court may not issue an
extraterritorial order against a party having no assets at all in the U.K.,
Lord Donaldson rightly replied that the argument had "neither rhyme
nor reason."47 In fact, he rightly found the argument to be perverse:
"[O]ther considerations apart, the fewer the assets within the jurisdiction
the greater the necessity for taking protective measures in relation to
those outside it.""a
Lord Donaldson also rejected the notion that the court should
appoint a receiver of the foreign assets of a company having no
residence in the U.K. only if the foreign authorities are likely to assist
such a receiver in the functions entrusted to it by the U.K. court. He
considered it sufficient that the foreign company is a party to the U.K.
action who "can properly be ordered to deal with its assets in
accordance with the orders of this court, regardless of whether the order
is recognised and enforced [by the local authorities]." 49

45. Id. at 79. He continued: "[This means] that the court should not go further than
necessity dictates, that in the first instance it should look to assets within the jurisdiction and
that in the majority of cases there will be no justification for looking to foreign assets."
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. Neill, L.J., agreed, seeing "no good reason for saying that a practice [such as the
Mareva injunction, and particularly the world-wide Mareva injunction] which has so recently
come into existence has already become ossified." He thus agreed that, while it would be
"unusual" to issue an order against the foreign assets of a party having no assets at all within
the jurisdiction, there was no reason categorically to exclude that possibility. Id. at 92.
49. Id. at 86.
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The court then reviewed the lower court's denial of provisional
relief against Milco-a denial that had been based on the fact that,
unlike CMI (which was incorporated in Luxembourg), Milco was
incorporated in a country (Panama) that was not a party to the Brussels
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments and was
therefore not obligated to enforce a U.K. injunction. Lord Donaldson,
quite properly, was not impressed with this distinction either:
Courts assume, rightly, that those who are subject to its
jurisdiction will obey its orders ....
It is only if there is
doubt about whether the order will be obeyed and if, should
that occur, no real sanction would exist, that the court should
refrain from making an order which the justice of the case
requires ....
[I]n the context of the grant of the Mareva injunction, I
think that a sufficient sanction exists in the fact that, in the
event of disobedience, the court could bar the defendant's
right to defend. This is not a consequence which it could
contemplate lightly as it would become a fugitive from a
final judgment given against it without its explanations
having been heard and which might well be enforced against
it by other courts ....
So far as enforcement [against Milco] is concerned, ... the
ordinary sanction of being debarred from defending should
suffice, but in any event I think that it is a mistake to spend
time considering whether English orders and judgments can
be enforced against Panamanian companies in Panama.
Whilst that is not perhaps the last forum to be considered in
the context of such enforcement, it is certainly not the first.
If in due time the plaintiffs are concerned to enforce a
judgment against Milco, they will be resorting to the
jurisdiction where its assets, if any, happen to be."
The court thus refused to allow any distinction to be drawn between
CMI and Milco on this basis.
Notwithstanding its willingness to issue world-wide Mareva
injunctions in appropriate circumstances, the Court of Appeal has drawn
the line at persons who are not parties to the main action and are not
otherwise deemed to be within the court's jurisdiction. In what is
known as the Babanaft proviso, after the case in which it was first laid

50. Id. at 81-82.
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down, 5 the U.K. courts consider that they should not, and under
international law may not, seek to control the activities abroad of
foreign nationals who are not subject to the ordering court's personal
jurisdiction. 2 It is difficult to argue with this proposition.
Given its close consideration of the proper international scope of
Mareva injunctions, U.K. case law may be a useful source of guidance
for American courts as they venture into the realm of provisional
restraints on foreign assets. Although, like most exercises of discretion,
the determination of how far to reach in quest of assets to secure
satisfaction of a future judgment depends on the totality of the
circumstances, at least some guidelines seem to have emerged from
U.K. practice. For one thing, the British courts claim to regard
provisional restraints on overseas assets more favorably when the
applicant asserts an actual property interest in those assets than when it
merely treats them as a convenient way of securing satisfaction of a
judgment. 3 In the same vein, they seem to find the extraterritorial
Mareva injunction less unattractive when the purpose of the U.K. action
is to adjudicate the merits of a claim, rather than merely to enforce a
judgment rendered by a foreign court or international arbitral tribunal. 4
However sensible these (and other) guidelines may be, it is nevertheless
51. See Babanaft Int'l Co. S.A. v. Bassatne, [1989] 1 All E.R. 433, 452 (Eng. C.A.). In
Republic ofHaiti v. Duvalier,[1989] 1 All E.R. 456 (Eng. C.A.), the Court of Appeal noted that
the Babanaft proviso "should not apply to individuals (i.e. natural persons) who are resident
in England and Wales," including officers of banks.
52. See Derby & Co. Ltd. v. Weldon (Nos. 3 & 4), [1990] 1 Ch. 65, 84 (Eng. C.A.);
Babanaft Int'l Co. S.A. v. Bassatne, [1990] 1 Ch. 13 (Eng. C.A.); Baltic Shipping Co. v.
Translink Shipping Ltd., [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 673 (Q.B.).
The situation may be different when the U.K. court is ordering measures of provisional
relief under Article 24 of the Brussels Convention. See infranotes 172-76 and accompanying
text.
53. See Republic of Haiti v. Duvalier, [1989] 1 All E.R. 456, 464-65 (Eng. C.A.).
54. Rosseel N.V. v. Oriental Commercial Shipping (U.K.) Ltd., [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1387,
1388-89 (Eng. C.A.):
[T]here is all the difference in the world between proceedings in this
country, whether by litigation or by arbitration, to determine rights of parties
on the one hand, and proceedings in this country to enforce rights which
have been determined by some other court or arbitral tribunal outside the
jurisdiction.
Where this court is concerned to determine rights then it will, in an
appropriate case, and certainly should, enforce its own judgment by
exercising what would be described as a long arm jurisdiction. But, where
it is merely being asked under a convention or an Act of Parliament to
enforce in support of another jurisdiction, whether in arbitration or litigation,
it seems to me that, save in an exceptional case, it should stop short of
making orders which extend beyond its own territorial jurisdiction.
See Securities & Invs. Bd. v. Pantell S.A., [1990] 1 Ch. 426, where a U.K. court froze the assets
of a Swiss company, including those held in branches of U.K. banks located outside the U.K.
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unlikely that they will ever serve as more than rules of thumb for the
exercise ofjudicial discretion.
3.

Strengthening the Court's Hand: The Repatriation of Assets

I have mentioned that, where attachable local assets are too few,
it may be necessary for the ordering court to look to assets outside the
jurisdiction. As also noted,55 however, a court strictly speaking can only
attach assets that are physically within its jurisdiction. In cases in
which the property owner is within the court's jurisdiction, the court
may be able to do no more than enjoin it from disposing of the
property. 6 While an injunction may not be as directly effective as an
actual attachment, it has traditionally been treated as the next best thing.
Some courts, however, have taken the further step of ordering the
defendant (or other party within the jurisdiction) to "repatriate" the
property in question. If obeyed, the order brings the once-foreign assets
within the court's jurisdiction, thus rendering them amenable to actual
attachment. The case of Inter-Regional Financial Group, Inc. v.
Hashemi 7 is a good illustration. There, the Second Circuit affirmed a
district court order directing the defendant to deliver stock certificates
located in foreign countries into the custody of the court clerk for
attachment to secure the judgment sought in the district court
proceeding. The Securities and Exchange Commission has been
particularly successful in obtaining court orders requiring alleged
securities law violators to repatriate profits that they had previously
transferred to foreign jurisdictions."
55. See supranote 20 and accompanying text.
56. See Ebsco Indus., Inc. v. Lilly, 840 F.2d 333, 334 (6th Cir. 1988).
57. 562 F.2d 152, 153 (2d Cir. 1977). The court there, pursuant to Rule 64 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, borrowed state prejudgment attachment standards. Cf. Siy v.
McMicking, 510 N.Y.S.2d 407,408 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (recognizing that a court can use its
injunctive powers to reach securities located abroad, but finding that the requirements for doing
so were not met in the case at bar). For an older view that is contrary to Hashemi, see
Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, N.V. v. Sentry Corp., 163 F. Supp. 800, 803 (E.D. Pa.
1958).
Under 26 U.S.C. § 7402, the United States has obtained orders in tax cases directing
taxpayers to repatriate assets from overseas to satisfy actual or potential judgments. See United
States v. Shaheen, 445 F.2d 6, 10-11 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Ross, 302 F.2d 831, 834
(2d Cir. 1962); United States v. McNulty, 446 F. Supp. 90, 92 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
58. See Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Antar, Litigation Release No. 12548, 46 S.E.C.
Docket No. 1108 (July 18, 1990), in Michael D. Mann, Paul A. Leder & Elizabeth Jacobs, The
Establishment of International Mechanisms for Enforcing Provisional Orders and Final
JudgmentsArisingfrom Securities Law Violations, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 303, 311-13
(1992).
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Not surprisingly, repatriation has also emerged in the practice of
the U.K. courts. The later phases of the Derby case, discussed earlier,
provide an excellent example. 9 At one point in that litigation, the
plaintiffs joined six additional individuals and companies as defendants
on account of their roles in the alleged conspiracy, and obtained worldwide Mareva injunctions against them as well. The plaintiffs also
prevailed upon the court to appoint a receiver of the assets of the added
defendants. The receiver, in turn, sought and obtained from the court
ex parte injunctions prohibiting the added defendants from removing
assets that they held in accounts in Brussels, Paris, Diisseldorf, Toronto,
Luxembourg, and New York from these jurisdictions.
These
injunctions were subsequently reinforced by orders of the courts of the
respective countries.
As had occurred earlier in the case, the receiver then sought to
have these exparte injunctions extended to the time ofjudgment. The
question arose as to what should happen when the assets in these
various countries reached maturity. One possibility (urged upon the
court by the defendants) was for these assets to be returned to
Switzerland, that being the place where most of the assets of the added
defendants were then located. Another possibility was for these assets
(and perhaps also the assets of the defendants that were already located
in Switzerland) to be ordered transferred out of Switzerland to another
jurisdiction (including, presumably, the U.K.). A reason for issuing
such an order would be that the Swiss courts were unlikely to recognize
or enforce a judgment that the U.K. court might ultimately render
against the defendants, and that they might even permit the relitigation
in Switzerland of all the underlying issues.
In the end, the chancery judge declined to release the assets located
outside Switzerland from the Mareva injunction so as to enable them to
be transferred to Switzerland upon maturity. At the same time,
however, he refused to order that the receivership assets then in
Switzerland, or in any of the other countries where they were located,
be transferred elsewhere (including the U.K.). Both parties appealed,
and the Court of Appeal affirmed.6 Dillon, L.J., began by reiterating
that U.K. courts may, in appropriate circumstances, issue world-wide
Mareva injunctions, and may even fortify them by appointing a receiver

59. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
60. Derby & Co. Ltd. v. Weldon (No. 6), [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1139, 1151 (Eng. C.A.).
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of overseas assets. 6' Turning to the facts of the case, he agreed that no
assets should be transferred to Switzerland from the other countries
where they were then located. His rationale was that such a transfer
would "permit a defendant to take action designed to ensure that
subsequent orders of the court are rendered less effective than would
otherwise be the case. 62
As to whether the Swiss assets should be transferred to another
jurisdiction, Lord Justice Dillon assumed that a U.K. court had the
power to order such a transfer in an appropriate case. He thought such
an order might be justifiable where the assets were located in a
jurisdiction that would refuse to enforce an eventual U.K. judgment-at
least if it could be shown that the owner's principal reason for
depositing them there had been to insulate them from enforcement. The
judge nevertheless considered the request to have been properly denied
under the circumstances. As to the transfer of assets then in
Switzerland, his rationale was that the parties who were in control of the
assets were expected to refuse to transfer them and the Swiss
government was not expected to compel them to do so. 63 As to the
transfer of assets from banks in Brussels, Paris, DUsseldorf, Toronto,
Luxembourg, and New York, he had a different reason for not issuing
an order. Based on past experience, he surmised that the courts of those
jurisdictions would be prepared to issue their own orders directly
enforcing both the Mareva injunction that the U.K. court had already
entered and the decisions made by the receiver whom the U.K. court had
appointed.
One suspects that, without wanting to rule out altogether the
61. ... The jurisdiction of the court to grant a Mareva injunction against a
person depends not on territorial jurisdiction of the English court over assets
within itsjurisdiction, but on the unlimited jurisdiction of the English court
inpersonamagainst any person, whether an individual or a corporation, who
is, under English procedure, properly made a party to proceedings pending
before the English court ....
[W]here a foreign court of the country where the assets are situated
refuses to recognize the receiver appointed by the English court, the English
court will, in an appropriate case, do what it can to render the appointment
effective by orders in personam against persons who are subject to the
jurisdiction of the English court ....
Id. at 1149-50. Staughton, L.J., concurring, underscored that situations warranting world-wide
orders "must be rare, if not very rare indeed," and that the appointment of a receiver of worldwide assets is likewise rarely to be ordered. Id. at 1153.
62. Dillon, L.J., was quoting from Lord Donaldson's ruling in Derby & Co. v. Weldon
(No. 6), [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1139 (Eng. C.A.). See supranote 60 and accompanying text.
63. To this extent, Dillon, L.J., acted on the dubious view that a court should not enter an
otherwise justifiable order because it anticipates non-cooperation by the addressee and/or the
local authorities. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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prospect of issuing repatriation orders in other situations, Dillon, L.J.,
nevertheless was seeking if at all possible to avoid issuing one in this
case. His colleague, Staughton, L.J., was perhaps more frank in
expressing his reservations about ordering the transfer of extraterritorial
assets to the U.K. or to a third country:
The growth of pre-trial restraint over the past 15 years has
had a number of consequences. The most obvious, although
not perhaps the most important, is an increasing demand on
the time of the courts and judges. No doubt it is desirable
that our judicial system should include measures to ensure
that judgments, when eventually given, are enforceable; and
it can be argued that the resources of the system must be
increased so as to make such measures available. But the
amount that the country can spend on courts and judges is
finite, just as is the amount that it can spend on the National
Health Service ....
One more significant consequence is the restraints that are
placed on defendants in the conduct of their affairs before
there has been any determination of liability against them;
they may, after all, eventually be found to owe nothing.
Another, which is relevant to these appeals, is an increasing
interference with transactions and property abroad. This
should not in my view be regarded lightly. If it ever became
common practice for English courts not merely to assume
jurisdiction over defendants abroad.., but also to order them
to transfer assets here so that any eventual judgment could be
more readily enforced, that would in my view justifiably be
regarded as unacceptable chauvinism by the international
community.
The very examples that Staughton, L.J., gave of situations justifying
issuance of a repatriation order-namely, "where the actual proceeds of
fraud are on board a ship on the high seas flying no national flag and
subject to no country's local jurisdiction [or] in a country which has no
effective system of law, or [in] one which can only be regarded as
wholly uncivilised"-show how very exceptional indeed he considered
them to be. In all other cases, he urged the courts to "proceed with great
caution."' Not surprisingly, Staughton, L.J., did not find the case

64. See Derby (No. 6), [1990] 1 W.L.R. at 1154 (Eng. C.A.).
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before him to be a sufficiently compelling one.6"
B.

Other Ways of Preservingthe Status Quo PendingLitigation

Attachment of assets to secure payment of a future judgment may
be regarded as a species of preserving the status quo, but it is not the
only one. Other scenarios, too, may be imagined in which transnational
provisional relief would enable a court to preserve the status quo or
otherwise "preserve the integrity of [its] final judgment."66 In the
following sections, I consider the principal respects, other than the
attachment of overseas assets to secure a future judgment, in which
transnational provisional relief may assist a court in preserving the
status quo.
1.

Enjoining Activity Abroad

Sometimes a pre-judgment attachment of assets is insufficient to
guarantee the effectiveness of a future judgment. A party may have to
take additional steps to ensure that changes of circumstances during the
pendency of the litigation will not undermine the efficacy of the relief
that the court ultimately grants it. To be effective, those steps may have
to be transnational.
The U.K. case of Attorney Generalv. Barker67 clearly illustrates
the point. There, the Court of Appeal affirmed a lower court order
enjoining a former employee of the Queen and his Canadian publisher
from publishing a book (entitled Courting Disaster) that disclosed
personal, and evidently quite embarrassing, information about the Royal

65. Of course it is very inconvenient for the plaintiffs if they have to fight the
case all over again in Switzerland before they can recover from some of the
defendants there ....But I do not see that it is sufficient ground for ordering
assets to be transferred from Switzerland elsewhere, at any rate pre-trial. It
is a misfortune for the plaintiffs that Switzerland is not a party to the
[Brussels Convention] ....But that should not by itself lead the English
courts to adopt what I would regard as a drastic and wholly exceptional
measure.
Id. at 1155. On all these aspects of the Derby litigation, see Lawrence Collins, The Territorial
Reach of Mareva Injunctions, 105 L.Q. REV. 262, 275-85 (1989); Lawrence Collins,
Provisionaland Protective Measures in InternationalLitigation, 234 RECUEIL DES COURS
[Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law] 9, 115-20 (1992), reprinted
in LAWRENCE COLLINS, ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

1 (1994) [hereinafter

COLLINS HAGUE LECTURES].

66. COLLINS HAGUE LECTURES, supra note 65, at 23.
67. [1990] 3 All E.R. 257 (Eng. C.A.).
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Household in violation of the express terms of his employment contract.
A question in the case was whether the court could properly issue an
interim order having effect outside the territory of the U.K. The court
answered that question in the affirmative. According to Lord
Donaldson:
[Counsel for the defendants] says... that foreigners, unlike
the citizens of this country, have a right to be informed which
overrides contractual rights. For that somewhat startling
proposition he relies in part on article 10 of the [European
Human Rights Convention]....
For my part, I would have thought that much more relevant
was the question of whether a man's word is his bond and
whether contractual obligations freely entered into shall be
maintained. It is not a question of what foreigners are
entitled to read, but what somebody subject to the jurisdiction
of this court is entitled to publish and it is an incidental result
that, if he cannot publish, foreigners cannot read.68
Injunctive relief that is transnational in this sense can in fact become
fairly routine. At the request of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, for example, U.S. courts will often temporarily enjoin
foreign companies from engaging in overseas conduct that may be
unlawful under the U.S. securities laws and that has adverse effects on
U.S. investors. In connection with this temporary injunctive relief,
courts have also appointed receivers and ordered the disgorgement of
misappropriated moneys.69
When a court of country X provisionally enjoins the performance
of acts on the territory of country Y, it runs the risk that country Y will
consider the order offensive to its own laws or policies and even to its
very sovereignty. As I show in a later section of this article,70 this may
well lead country Y to withhold the assistance it might otherwise be
prepared to give to the orders of country X courts, and possibly even to
order countermeasures. The Supreme Court has affirmed that courts
must avoid "interference with the sovereignty of another nation" when
they exercise their equity powers to "command persons properly before

68. Id. at 260-61. Lord Donaldson immediately added: "I am bound to say, having read
this book, I do not think they will miss anything at all, but that is merely a personal view." Id.
at 261.
69. See Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Capital Growth Co., (Costa Rica), 391 F. Supp.
593, 596-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
70. See notes 172-81 infra and accompanying text.
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[them] to cease or perform acts outside [their] territorial jurisdiction."'"
The Restatement 3d of Foreign Relations Law strongly and
appropriately echoes this theme.72
Despite the utility of transnational injunctive relief, it is not as
frequently sought from U.S. courts as might be expected. At least one
commentator has described the situation as "surprising," considering
that "parties embarking on litigation with foreign parties must often
[fear] that, unless restrained, their adversaries will take actions that will
make ultimate victory pyrrhic."7 3
The absence of any general policy on transnational provisional
relief for purposes of preserving the status quo is not, of course, due to
any lack of appropriate legal remedies. U.S. law offers a perfectly
appropriate remedy for these purposes, namely the preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order, and other nations have the
equivalent.74 Although these remedies-and the standards for their
use-have by and large been developed for domestic cases, they have
no less potential for preserving the status quo in transnational cases.
The basic objective of a court would presumably be the same in both
types of cases: to find the appropriate balance between ensuring the
effectiveness of relief to which the claimant ultimately may be entitled
and protecting its adversary 75
from unjustified restraints prior to the final
determination of the claim.

71. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 289 (1952).
72. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW THIRD: THE FOREIGN RELAnONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 401, 403 (1987).
73. David Westin & Peter Chrocziel, Interim ReliefAwarded by U.S. and German Courts
in Support of Foreign Proceedings,28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 723, 723 (1990).
74. See COLLINS HAGUE LECTURES, supra note 65, at 11-12 (citing Films Rover Int'l Ltd.
v. Cannon Film Sales Ltd., [1987] 1 W.L.R. 670, 680 (Ch.)).
75. This is not to say that all jurisdictions employ the same test for determining whether
a preliminary injunction is warranted. A notable point of disagreement involves whether and
to what extent the underlying merits of the dispute should be taken into account at this
preliminary stage. Many systems appear to assess the merits preliminarily in all requests for
provisional relief. The newer view in the United Kingdom, however, is that the court need
examine the merits at this stage only to satisfy itself that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious,
and that it should avoid becoming prematurely drawn into the parties' relative probabilities of
success. Entitlement to preliminary relief is thus ordinarily to be based not on a prediction of
outcome, but on "whether the plaintiff would be adequately compensated by damages after trial
...and, if he would not, whether the balance of convenience requires that an injunction be
granted." COLLINS HAGUE LECTURES, supra note 65, at 13 (citing American Cyanamid Co. v.
Ethicon Ltd., [1975] App. Cas. 396 (Eng. C.A.)). The main exception to this rule is in
situations where granting or refusing the protective measure would effectively dispose of the
whole action, in which case the relative strength of the parties' claims is appropriately taken
into account. See N.W.L. Ltd. v. Woods (The "Nawala"), [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 325, 330
(Eng. C.A.).
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Ordering the Preservation of Evidence

Another specific way in which a court may seek to maintain the
status quo pending litigation is to order a party to preserve documents
or other evidence important to that litigation. In the U.K., such a
remedy is known as an Anton Pillerorder, after the case in which it was
formally recognized.76 In that case, Lord Denning, for the Court of
Appeal, held that courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue an order
requiring that a party give its opponent access to its premises so that the
latter may inspect, copy, and even remove evidence located there. U.K.
courts are supposed to issue such orders only upon a showing that vital
evidence is likely to be destroyed or secreted and, even then, only if the
order would not cause undue harm to the defendant or the defendant's
case. Like the Mareva injunction, the Anton Piller order has obvious
utility in transnational litigation. To be sure, the extraterritoriality of the
premises is a factor that is likely to weigh against the grant of such an
order, perhaps even heavily so.' Nevertheless, U.K. courts occasionally
have addressed Anton Pillerorders to U.K. and non-U.K. nationals alike
in connection with premises located outside the U.K., provided those
parties are otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the British courts.78
In recognition of the Anton Piller order's inherent intrusiveness,
U.K. courts have refused to issue such an order until they have
76. See Anton Piller KG v. Mfg. Processes Ltd., [1976] Ch. 55 (Eng. C.A. 1975).
77. See Protector Alarms Ltd. v. Maxim Alarms Ltd., [1978] F.S.R. 442, 446 (Ch.)
In my view the Anton Pillertype of order represents a very special form of
the court's action. It is a highly localized and coercive form of mandatory
order requiring the party against whom it is made, without prior notice, to
admit representatives of the opponent to specified premises. That is very
different from a practical point of view from a negative injunction requiring
a party to abstain from doing something abroad and very different also from
a mandatory order to supply in this country goods of foreign manufacture [as
in the case of Acrow (Automation) v. Rex Chainbelt Inc., [1971] 3 All E.R.
1175 (Eng. C.A.)] .... Taking a practical view of the nature of an Anton
Piller order and the way that it is enforced, I do not find it consistent with
the comity prevailing between the courts of the several parts of the United
Kingdom for the English court to make an Anton Pillerorder in respect of
premises in Scotland. If the Court of Session is able to grant and does grant
such relief it is better, though far less convenient for the plaintiff, that it
should be sought there. If, however, the Court of Session is unable or
unaccustomed to grant relief of this kind, it seems to me even more
inappropriate for the English courts to authorize a search expedition on
Scottish soil. Therefore, without assuming to decide abstract questions of
jurisdiction, I shall exercise my discretion to decline to include Scottish
addresses in the order.
78. See, e.g., Cook Indus. v. Galliher, [1979] 1 Ch. 439. See also Campbell McLachlan,
TransnationalApplications ofMareva Injunctions andAnton Pillar Orders, 36 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 669, 678-79 (1987).
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established the existence of personal jurisdiction over the addressee.
The case of Altertext Inc. v. Advanced Data Communications Ltd.7 9 is
illustrative. There, the plaintiff asked the court for Anton Piller orders
against the six parties that it had named, though not yet served, in the
main action. The court was willing, on the proper showing, to issue
such an order against the five defendants who were English, but not
against the remaining defendant, which was a Belgian company, albeit
directed and controlled by the five others. Underscoring that the order
would require the company to allow the plaintiff to enter upon Belgian
premises to copy and even remove evidence, the court observed:
[A] foreign defendant is, prima facie, not subject to the
jurisdiction of the court. Such a defendant may become
subject to the jurisdiction of the court if service of process
can be effected on the defendant in England .... But until
service has been effected the foreign defendant does not
become subject to the jurisdiction of the court.
An Anton Piller order is an in personam order. It is an
order which it is within the power of the court to make in an
action in which the court has jurisdiction. It ought not,
however, in my view, to be made except against a party over
whom the court does have jurisdiction. If the order is sought
ex parte before service of the writ and against a foreign
defendant in respect of foreign premises, an essential
requirement must be that the case is one in which leave...
for service outside the jurisdiction ought to be given.
Otherwise the court has no jurisdiction over that defendant.
But since the initial application is ex parte and since the
foreign defendant may seek to have the leave.., set aside,
the assumption by the court of jurisdiction is, in a sense,
provisional only .... [Thus,] the Anton Pillerorder ought not
to be executed until the foreign defendant has been given the
opportunity to apply to set aside the.., leave .... It would
be wrong, in my view, for the court to . . . require a
mandatory order of an Anton Pillercharacter to be executed
[before the foreign defendant] has had an opportunity to
challenge the court's assumption of jurisdiction over him. 0
The court then addressed the plaintiffs argument that suspending
execution of the order for the period necessary to establish jurisdiction

79. [1985] 1 W.L.R. 457 (Ch. 1984).
80. Id. at461-63.
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would render the order useless:
It does not follow that persons in the position of the plaintiff
[]t might have been
are without alternative remedy ....
possible for effective concurrent proceedings to have been
commenced in Belgium for the purpose of obtaining or
preserving, any relevant evidence situated in the
defendant's Belgian premises."1
This last bit of reasoning assumes, of course, a Belgian court's
willingness to assist the U.K. litigation in this manner, thus raising
larger questions to which I turn in Part III.
III. PROVISIONAL RELIEF IN AID OF FOREIGN LITIGATION
Provisional relief assumes an important transnational aspect not
only when the forum is asked to funish relief implicating persons or
property abroad, but also when it is asked to issue local protective
orders in connection with litigation in a foreign jurisdiction. That
transnational provisional relief should have this further dimension is not
in the least surprising. Reference has already been made to the fact that,
while the courts of country X may see fit to issue protective orders
affecting persons or property in country Y, they may not be able to
ensure that those orders are obeyed or that the relief sought to be
achieved will otherwise be effective. Precisely because they cannot
enforce their orders of transnational provisional relief extraterritorially,
the courts of country X may find that they also need orders of
provisional relief from the courts of country Y. From the point of view
of the latter courts, such relief is likewise transnational in an important
sense.
Despite the importance of the issue, U.S. law thus far has not
adopted a particularly coherent position on the availability of
provisional relief in aid of foreign litigation. As has already been
noted, 2 legislation or treaty provides a reasonably good framework for
analysis with respect to certain other distinctive forms of international
judicial assistance-notably, serving documents, obtaining evidence,

81. Id. at 463. It should be noted that even if a party obtains information on the
whereabouts of property overseas from an Anton Piller order, the requesting party may still
have to seek permission from the U.K. court to use the information and documents obtained for
the purpose of commencing civil proceedings in those other jurisdictions. Such permission was
granted in BayerAG v. Winter, [1986] F.S.R. 357 (Ch. 1985).
82. See notes 1-10 supra and accompanying text.
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and recognizing or enforcing foreign country judgments. With respect
to still other forms of assistance, the ground rules may be less well
established, but the propriety of such assistance is still generally
conceded. A good example is an order by a court of country Y
compelling a party to participate in proceedings in the courts of country
X, where that party had previously consented to do so. 3 In such cases,
the courts of country Y presumably will intervene only if they have a
basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over the party sought to be
compelled. That party may, of course, have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the courts of country Y through a forum selection
clause. 4 But country Y's courts may have a sufficient basis of
jurisdiction to order transnational provisional relief even in the absence
of such a clause.
Once we move beyond these fairly standardized situations, matters
become much less clear. Writing on the subject of transnational
provisional relief in this journal some eight years ago, two
commentators reported that "there is at present nothing that can fairly

83. Arbitration provides an analogy. In the United States, the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994), authorizes a court having jurisdiction over a party to issue an order
compelling that party to proceed to arbitration in a foreign jurisdiction. Indeed, § 8 permits a
court in admiralty cases not only to commence an action by "libel and seizure of the vessel or
other property of the other party according to the usual course of admiralty proceeding," but
also to retain jurisdiction in order to enter judgment upon an eventual award. In the case of
Blueye Navigation, Inc. v. OlteniaNavigation,Inc., Nos. 94 Civ. 1500,94 Civ. 2653, 1995 WL
66654, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1995), a U.S. company asked the court to attach the
defendant's property in New York to secure an award expected in an arbitration proceeding
then pending in London. The request was denied due to the plaintiff s inability to identify any
property belonging to the defendant in the district. The court dismissed the action without
prejudice, however, in the event that it was subsequently able to locate property of the
defendant within the district.
84. The English case of Acrow (Automation) Ltd. v. Rex Chainbelt Inc. is a good
illustration. The Court of Appeal sustained an interim injunction against a U.S. corporation
("S.I.") that had declined to appear in a breach of contract action brought in the U.K. by its
U.K. licensee. The order enjoined S.I. from refusing to supply goods to the plaintiff. (S.I.'s
English subsidiary-a co-defendant in the action-appeared and submitted to the injunction).
When S.I. disregarded the order in the belief that it was not bound by it, the Court of Appeal
disagreed:
The proceedings in England were not only against the English subsidiary.
They were also against the American parent, S.I. The licence agreement
expressly gave jurisdiction to English courts ....S.I. were bound by this
injunction just as much as if it had been granted by United States courts. It
could be enforced by proceedings in the English courts, as, for instance, by
a writ of sequestration of the property of S.I. in the United Kingdom. It
could not be enforced directly in the courts of the United States, but those
courts would, I have no doubt, out of comity, recognise the injunction,
especially as it gave effect to a contract that was governed by English law
and was expressly subject to the jurisdiction of the English courts.
Acrow (Automation) Ltd. v. Rex Chainbelt Inc., [1971] 3 All E.R. 1175, 1179 (Eng. C.A.).
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be described as a general U.S. approach to the question of when U.S.
courts will issue interim orders in support of non-U.S. proceedings. 85
Though this situation may, for the reasons I indicated earlier,86 be
entirely understandable, it is not entirely satisfactory.
In this part of the article, I examine transnational provisional relief
from the perspective of the courts of country Y. Not surprisingly, the
main scenarios closely mirror the scenarios already examined in the
preceding part, where the focus was on the courts of country X.
A.

FreezingLocalAssets in Aid of ForeignProceedings

The transnational "freezing" of assets dominates discussions of
transnational provisional relief when viewed from the perspective of
country Y, much as it did when viewed from the perspective of country
X. Moreover, in entertaining requests for transnational provisional
relief of this sort, the courts of country Y-like the courts of country
X-face both jurisdictional and substantive questions. The case of
Barclays Bank, S.A. v. Tsakos" is a striking example.
Barclays, a French bank (and wholly-owned subsidiary of a British
bank of the same name), brought suit in a court of the District of
Columbia against a Greek couple (the Tsakos) to enforce a guarantee on
a loan that the bank's Paris office had made to their son. Barclays
concurrently sued Mr. and Mrs. Tsakos in France and Switzerland, but
by that time the couple evidently had placed their assets in those
countries beyond the bank's reach. In the U.S. action, Barclays
obtained a pre-judgment attachment of the cooperative apartment that
the Tsakos owned in the Watergate complex in Washington, D.C. The
Tsakos then moved to dismiss the U.S. action onforum non conveniens
grounds. Granting their motion, the trial court ruled that, once the
88
action was dismissed, the attachment "ipsofacto" had to be lifted too.
On appeal by the bank, the D.C. appellate court acknowledged the
distinction between what I have called the jurisdictional and the
substantive aspects of the attachment order. In affirming its jurisdiction
the court relied on dictum in the case of Shaffer v. Heitner, where the
United States Supreme Court had stated: "at most... a State in which

85. David Westin & Peter Chrocziel, Interim ReliefAwarded by U.S. and German Courts
in Support of ForeignProceedings,28 COLUM. J TRANSNAT'L L. 723, 725 (1990).
86. See notes 1-10 supra and accompanying text.
87. 543 A.2d 802 (D.C. 1988).
88. See id. at 804.
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property is located should have jurisdiction to attach that property...
as security for a judgment being sought in a forum where the litigation
can be maintained" consistent with the requirements of due process. 9
As to the merits of the relief sought, however, the appellate court was
not asked to, nor did it, review the lower court's determination that an
attachment was justified. The closest it came to the merits was to
reverse the lower court's decision for erroneously assuming that the
dismissal of the action (and the resulting discharge of the attachment)
must follow as a matter of course when aforum non conveniens motion
is granted; the appellate court instructed the lower court on remand to
determine whether, notwithstanding the conclusion that the merits of the
action should not be tried in its jurisdiction under the doctrine offorum
non conveniens, the action should be stayed and the attachment
maintained pending the outcome of the proceedings in France.9" On this
latter question, other courts have subsequently taken the same position.9
The Barclays Bank decision thus not only distinguishes between
jurisdiction and merits in freezing local assets in aid of foreign
litigation, but also clearly dissociates the question of jurisdiction to
order provisional relief from the question of jurisdiction to adjudicate
the underlying claim. The decision has other important implications for
the subject of transnational provisional relief as well. In the first place,
it suggests that the owners of property located within the jurisdiction of
a court do not themselves also have to be within the personal
jurisdiction of that court in order for the latter to entertain an application
for provisional relief concerning that property.92 Second, the property

89. See id. at 804 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner,433 U.S. at 210). See also supra notes 1617 and accompanying text.
90. See id. at 806-08. According to the appellate court, the district court had a choice
between dismissing the action on forum non conveniens grounds or staying the action on the
same grounds, while maintaining the attachment. See id. On remand, the trial court stayed the
action pending the outcome of the French litigation. The bank eventually sought ajudgment
condemning the apartment in enforcement of the French court's subsequent judgment against
the Tsakos in the amount of $2.5 million. See First Says. Bank v. Barclays Bank, S.A., 618
A.2d 134, 135 (D.C. 1992).
91. In the case of Mendes v. DowelancoIndus. Ltda, 651 So.2d 776, 778 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1995), a state court was upheld in deciding to maintain a temporary injunction freezing
the defendants' bank accounts within the state, even after ordering the action stayed on the
ground that the dispute was best resolved in connection with a suit involving the same parties
and issues already pending in Brazil.
92. On the other hand, the presence of assets was by no means the Tsakos' only
connection with the District of Columbia. The court noted that Mr. Tsakos had once operated
a business in Washington DC, and that the couple had lived in the Watergate apartment for
some period of time. "Although these contacts existed prior to the making of the disputed loan
and may be insufficient to support in personamjurisdiction..., they need not be ignored." See
Barclay'sBank, S.A. v. Tsakos, 543 A.2d at 805 (footnote omitted).
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in question evidently does not have to bear any particular relationship
to the subject matter of the foreign litigation. Third, a court may
apparently be justified in granting provisional relief even in the absence
of any order (interim or otherwise) on the part of the foreign court that
would be hearing the main action-and indeed absent any indication
from that court as to the measure's necessity or appropriateness. The
latter is a point to which I shall return.
Finally, the remand in Barclays Bank raises the question of
whether the standards for granting a pre-judgment attachment should
differ according to whether the main action is being heard in that same
court or in a court of another country. The appeals court did not take a
position on this question, and the position it would be likely to take is
unclear. On the one hand, if the court thought there should be no
difference, it should simply have maintained the attachment since the
lower court had already found that (but for the forum non conveniens
dismissal) the attachment was justified. On the other hand, the court
gave no positive indication that the analysis should differ in the two
situations, nor did it imply what the difference (if any) should be.'
On each of these questions-pertinent and interesting though they
may be-U.S. case law is remarkably thin. These questions will
necessarily recur, however, since litigants may be expected to bring
increased pressure on courts to grant relief of this sort in the years
ahead. At this stage, the U.K. courts (which, once again, share many of
the presuppositions of U.S. courts about transnational provisional relief)
offer a richer body of experience. In consulting that experience, one
should bear in mind that, by virtue of British membership in the
European Community (and now the European Union), U.K. practice has
come to be influenced in large part by the European Convention on
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments (the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions).94
Article 24 of the Convention expressly provides that a court
lacking jurisdiction to decide the merits of a case may entertain a
request for provisional relief pending a decision on the merits by a
competent court in another contracting state. According to Article 24,

93. By the same token, in the case of Republic of the Philippinesv. Marcos,806 F.2d 344
(2d Cir. 1986), the Court of Appeals at one stage affirmed a preliminary injunction barring the
Marcoses from transferring or encumbering real property in New York, without drawing
attention to the fact that the underlying dispute was at that time being litigated in the Philippines
rather than the United States. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
94. See Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, July 28, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1413.
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[a]pplication may be made to the courts of a Contracting
State for such provisional, including protective, measures as
may be available under the law of that State, even if, under
this Convention, the courts of another Contracting State have
jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter."
Presumably, any provisional measure ordered by a court of a contracting
state pursuant to Article 24 of the Convention will itself be entitled
(under the general policies of the Convention) to recognition
and
96
enforcement by the courts of all the other contracting states.
The Court of Justice of the European Communities set forth the
rationale behind Article 24 in its judgment in the case of Denilaulerv.
9 7 That ruling arose
S. n. c. Couchet Frbres.
out of an action in French
court by a French seller against a German buyer for the purchase price
of goods. The French court issued an ex parte order freezing the
defendant's accounts at the Frankfurt branch of the Socijtd Gingrale
Alsacienne de Banque, and the plaintiff succeeded in having the freeze
order enforced by a German court. On appeal, the German appellate
court asked the European Court of Justice to decide whether the
Brussels Convention requires courts to enforce provisional measures
ordered by courts of another contracting state when those orders have
been issued on a wholly exparte basis. In the course of answering that
specific question, the Court broadly emphasized the discretion enjoyed
by the courts "of the place.., where the assets subject to the measures
sought are located." According to the Court, those courts are "best able
to assess the circumstances which may lead to the grant or refusal of the
measures sought."9 8 Clearly, then, Article 24 authorizes attachment in
aid of foreign litigation, but does not in all circumstances compel it.
Likewise, the U.K. implementing legislation-Section 25 of the
Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act of 1982-authorizes courts to
grant interim relief in connection with litigation begun or to be begun
in another contracting state (or in another U.K. court), provided the
litigation concerns a subject matter within the scope of the Convention.
Like Article 24 itself, Section 25 permits courts to decline to grant

95. Id. art. 24.
96. Article 25 defines the judgments entitled to recognition and enforcement under the
Convention so as to include non-final and non-monetary judgments.
97. See generally Case 125/79, Denilauler v. S.n.c. Couchet Fr&res, 1980 E.C.R. 1553.
98. Id.at 1570. For a discussion of the case, see Lawrence Collins, The TerritorialReach
of Mareva Injunctions, 105 L.Q. REV. 262, 290-94 (1989). Collins emphasizes that Article 24
is "permissive" only. "National law may (not must) supply the remedy." Lawrence Collins,
ProvisionalMeasures, the Conflict of Laws and the Brussels Convention, 1 Y.B. EUR. L. 249,
254(1981).
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relief, though apparently only where, "in the opinion of the court, the
fact that the court has no jurisdiction... in relation to the subject-matter
of the proceedings in question makes it inexpedient for the court to
grant it."9 9 U.K. case law on Section 25 reflects the basic Community
law notion that national courts must provide essentially the same
provisional remedies (and employ the same standards for doing so) that
they would ordinarily provide under like circumstances in domestic
cases pending before them. At the same time, courts are not restricted
to providing the remedies that the foreign court hearing the main action
ordinarily provides under those circumstances.'
The case ofX v. Y 0 ' illustrates a standard application of Section
25. There, a French bank sought and obtained an order from a London
court enjoining a Saudi party (against which the Bank had brought suit
in Paris) from disposing of any money held for its account in the
London branch of a U.S. bank. The London court found that the
underlying claim was based on an undisputed debt and that the
defendant was likely to remove those assets to Saudi Arabia, where they
would no longer be available for satisfaction of an $ 8 million judgment
that the bank was likely to win in the French action.0 2
Although the U.K. court inX v. Y froze assets in aid of a foreign
proceeding, it at least did so with respect to assets located within the
U.K. A more interesting and difficult question is whether, in a proper
case, the U.K. court could (or indeed must) seek to achieve the same
result with respect to assets located outside the U.K. This was precisely
the situation in the case of Republic of Haiti v. Duvalier.1°3 That case
arose out of an action brought in France by the Republic of Haiti against
the former Haitian president and members of his family and associates
to recover some $120 million allegedly embezzled under the Duvalier
regime. Based on evidence that the Duvalier family was attempting to

99. Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, 1982, ch. 27, § 25.
100. See Alltrans Inc. v. Interdom Holdings Ltd., [1991] 4 All E.R. 458, 468 (Eng. C.A.).
The court also ruled that, while section 25 of the 1982 statute was enacted to give effect to
Article 24 of the Brussels Convention, it is not necessarily limited in scope and effect by the
obligations set out in that Article. "Since the source of the English court's jurisdiction is not
art[icle] 24 but s[ection] 25, there is no reason why it should not be wider than the article would
confer." Id. at 469.
101. [1990] 1 Q.B. 220. See also House of Spring Gardens Ltd. v. Waite, [1984] F.S.R 277
(Ch.).
102. The court also took the opportunity to hold that Section 25 of the Civil Jurisdiction
and Judgments Act of 1982 is not limited to cases in which the defendant against whom the
provisional relief is sought is domiciled in a convention state. See X. v. Y., [1990] 1 Q.B. 220,
229.
103. [1990] 1 Q.B. 202.
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conceal its assets, the Republic of Haiti sought and obtained a Mareva
order in a U.K. trial court. This order not only froze the family's assets
within the U.K. up to the value of $120 million, but also (1) barred
family members from dealing with assets, wherever located, that
represented the proceeds of the alleged embezzlement, and (2)
compelled them to10disclose
the nature, location, and value of all their
4
world-wide.
assets
In fact, the U.K. court's basis of jurisdiction over the Duvaliers
was highly tenuous. None of the family members was resident in the
U.K., and the U.K. evidently lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits
of the underlying claim." 5 Moreover, although the family had engaged
English solicitors to administer some of their assets, most of those assets
were in fact located outside the U.K. On appeal, the Duvaliers argued
that the Republic of Haiti should have sought interim relief, if at all,
either from a French court (since the action was pending in France) or
from a court in the country where the bulk of the assets were located.
The Court of Appeal, however, sustained the order in full. Admitting
that "[the] cases where it will be appropriate to grant such an injunction
will be rare-if not very rare indeed," Staughton, L.J., nevertheless
affirmed the courts' jurisdiction, in appropriate circumstances, "to grant
a Mareva injunction, pending trial, over assets worldwide." He found
these to be such circumstances:
What... is determinative is the plain and admitted intention
of the defendants to move their assets out of the reach of the
courts of law, coupled with the resources they have obtained
and the skill they have hitherto shown in doing that, and the

104. See id.at 208. The order was made pursuant to the Supreme Court Act, 1981, ch. 54,
§ 37, and the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, 1982, ch. 27, § 25(1). See id. at 205, 209,
215-16.
Section 37 authorizes the High Court "by order (whether interlocutory or final) [to]
grant an injunction or appoint a receiver in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just
and convenient to do so." It specifies, in subsection 3, that "[t]he power . . . to grant an
interlocutory injunction restraining a party to any proceedings from removing from the
jurisdiction of the High Court, or otherwise dealing with, assets located within that jurisdiction
shall be exercisable in cases where that party is, as well as in cases where he is not, domiciled,
resident or present within that jurisdiction."
Section 25(1) permits the High Court to grant interim relief even "where . . .
proceedings have been or are to be commenced in a Contracting State other than the United
Kingdom."
105. Clearly the fact that the U.K. has no jurisdiction in relation to the subject matter of the
underlying proceedings is not a bar to awarding interim relief under Section 25, since Section
25(2) authorizes a U.K. court to refuse relief if "the fact that the court has no jurisdiction apart
from this section in relation to the subject-matter of the proceedings in question makes it
inexpedient for the court to grant it." Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment Act, 1982, ch. 27, §
25(2).
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vast amount of money involved. This case demands
international co-operation between all nations .... [I]f ever
there was a case for the exercise of the court's powers, this
must be it .... If the Duvalier family have a defence to the
substantive claim, and feel that they are being persecuted,
then their remedy ... is to co-operate in securing an early
trial of the dispute. It is not to secrete their assets where even
the most just decision in the world cannot reach them.I 6
The decision is striking in still another respect: it enabled the
government of Haiti to obtain provisional relief far in excess of the
scope of relief that the French court hearing the main action would have
granted if the request had been addressed to it. Indeed, a French court
would not have granted such broad relief even if the action had been
pending in the U.K. and ancillary provisional relief had been sought in
France. It is also noteworthy that the government of Haiti appears to
have obtained this far-reaching relief from the U.K. without the French
court in which the main action was pending having made any such
request to the U.K. court, and conceivably even without its
knowledge.'0 7 In this respect, if in no other, the result is questionable.
While prompted by Article 24 of the Brussels Convention,
enactment of the U.K. implementing legislation just discussed was also
necessary in light of the traditional restrictions placed by the House of
Lords on the grant of provisional relief in aid of foreign litigation. The
principal decision of the Lords had been Siskina v. Distos Compania
Naviera S.A. (The Siskina). °8 The Siskina was a vessel owned by a
Panamanian company but managed in Piraeus, Greece. When the vessel
was about to enter the Suez Canal en route from Italy to Saudi Arabia,
loaded with $5 million in cargo, the shipowner ordered that the ship turn
back and unload the cargo in Cyprus on the ground that the Italian
charterers of the ship had failed to pay the full freight owed under the
charter agreement. The shipowners asserted a lien on the discharged
cargo for the unpaid freight, and brought an action in the courts of
Cyprus. While en route back to Greece, the vessel sank in Greek
waters, whereupon the shipowner filed a $700,000 claim against its
London insurer. Meanwhile, the cargo owners in Saudi Arabia, having
brought an action in Genoa against the shipowner for damages for the
arrest of the cargo (pursuant to a clause in the bill of lading designating

106. Duvalier,[1990] 1 Q.B. at 216-17.
107. See Peter F. Schlosser, CoordinatedTransnationalInteractionin Civil Litigationand
Arbitration, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 150, 151-52 (1990).
108. See [1977] 3 All E.R. 803 (Eng. C.A.).
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Genoa as the exclusive forum for disputes), also sought an injunction in
the U.K. restraining the shipowners from disposing of the insurance
proceeds of the Siskina or removing them from the jurisdiction. They
argued that otherwise the proceeds would disappear into one of the
shipowner's foreign bank accounts.
The principal question for the English courts was whether the
insurance proceeds could properly be attached in the U.K. to secure an
anticipated foreign judgment, given that the defendant in the foreign
action (and obligee of the insurance debt) was outside the jurisdiction
of the U.K. and that the dispute bore no other relationship with the U.K.
The trial court held that its lack ofjurisdiction over the defendant in the
main proceedings barred it from addressing a Mareva injunction to the
defendant. A majority of the Court of Appeal, speaking through Lord
Denning, disagreed, invoking the notion of comity toward judicial
proceedings pending in Italy, another Community state. 10 9
The House of Lords, in turn, reversed. In an opinion by Lord
Diplock, the Lords effectively held that a U.K. court lacks jurisdiction
to award provisional relief against a party to a foreign proceeding unless
it has an independent basis of personal jurisdiction over that party.
What was fatal to the request, therefore, was not the contractual choice
of a foreign forum in Genoa but the absence of any jurisdictional basis
in the U.K. While recognizing that "there may be merits in . . .
extending the jurisdiction of the High Court over foreign defendants" in
this fashion, Lord Diplock could find no basis in either treaty or comity
for doing so.110
Subject to Section 25, The Siskina is presumably still good law.
British courts may therefore be expected, in cases falling outside the
Brussels and Lugano Conventions, to continue denying requests to
attach U.K. assets in anticipation of a foreign judgment unless the U.K.
has an independent basis ofjurisdiction over the owner of those assets.
This is borne out by the recent Privy Council decision in Mercedes Benz

109. The U.K., though by that time an E.C. member state, had not yet acceded to the
Brussels Convention. If it had, Article 24 arguably would have required the U.K. courts to
grant provisional relief under these circumstances.
110. See Siskina v. Distos S.A. [1979] App. Cas. 259-60. For a similar reasoning and
result, see Serge Caudron v. Air Zaire, [1986] I.L.R.M. 10.
On the other hand, certain civil law jurisdictions have long been willing to order
protective measures in aid of actions pending on the merits abroad. For example, French courts
on a number of occasions have sustained, upon a showing of "urgency," the provisional
attachment of property in France pending determination of the merits of a dispute in a foreign
country court. See, e.g., Socidt6 Intrabank v. Beidas, T.G.I. Paris, 1970 REVUE CRITIQUE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt

[R.C.D.I.P.] 714, 714-16.
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A. G. v. Leiduck.1" There, on appeal from a decision of a Hong Kong
court, the Privy Council refused to attach the local assets of a German
company against which Mercedes-Benz had brought suit in the courts
of Monaco."' It found that the defendant in the Monaco action was not
present within Hong Kong and that the Hong Kong court therefore
lacked authority to restrain the defendant's disposition of its property:
It may well be that in some future case where there is
undoubted personal jurisdiction over the defendant ... an
attempt will be made to obtain Mareva relief in support of a
claim pursued in a foreign court ....
[A] situation would
[then] exist in which the availability of relief otherwise
considered permissible and expedient would depend upon the
susceptibility of the defendant to personal service.'1 "
Although the case prompted a vigorous dissent,1 4 it expresses a very
clear limitation on the willingness of British courts, outside applicable
conventions, to ensure that U.K. assets are available to enforce
prospective foreign country judgments.
B.

The Effect of a Choice of Forum or ArbitrationClause

Before turning to remedies other than the pre-judgment attachment
of assets, it is worth considering how the availability of provisional
relief from a court other than the forum might be affected by the
presence of a choice of forum clause. Suppose the parties to litigation
in country X had validly designated country X as the exclusive
jurisdiction for resolving their disputes," 5 but one of them finds it

111.
(P.C.).
112.
113.
114.

See Mercedes Benz A.G. v. Leiduck, [1996] 1 App. Cas. 284, [1995] 3 W.L.R. 718

Neither Hong Kong nor Monaco is a party to the Brussels or Lugano Conventions.
Mercedes Benz, [1996] 1 App. Cas. at 304.
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead filed the dissent. He wrote in part:
The first defendant's argument comes to this: his assets are in Hong Kong,
so the Monaco court cannot reach them; he is in Monaco, so the Hong Kong
court cannot reach him. That cannot be right. That is not acceptable today.
A person operating internationally cannot so easily defeat the judicial
process.
Id. at 305.
115. A court may, of course, rationalize granting interim injunctive relief, despite the
presence of a clause giving exclusive jurisdiction to a foreign court, by finding the clause to be
invalid or unenforceable. Such was the case in Evans Marshall& Co. v. Bertola S.A., [1973]
1 W.L.R. 349 (Eng. C.A.). Evans Marshall was a wholesale wine merchant that had for over
twenty years distributed a Spanish sherry, known as Bertola, in the U.K. When new owners
took over Bertola, they declared Evans Marshall's performance to be unsatisfactory and
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necessary or desirable to seek an ancillary order of provisional relief
from a court of country Y. Although such relief presumably will have
the limited purpose of securing ajudgment expected to be rendered by
the court designated by the parties, it nevertheless could be viewed as
an intrusion on the jurisdiction of that court. In this section, I examine
this question both through the handful of cases directly on point and
through the much larger number of cases dealing with the analogous
problem ofjudicial intervention in disputes subject to arbitration.
One of the few U.S. decisions to address the issue squarely is
Sanko Steamship Co. v. Newfoundland Refining Co., Ltd. 16 In Sanko,
a shipping company brought suit for breach of a charter party agreement
and, in that connection, sought to attach certain New York bank
balances claimed to be owed to the defendants. The defendants moved
to dismiss the underlying action on the basis of the parties' prior choice
of England as the exclusive forum for resolution of their disputes (citing7
the Supreme Court decision in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,11
which essentially upheld the validity of international choice of forum
clauses), and also opposed the grant of the attachment. The plaintiff
argued that Bremen was not controlling because the plaintiff in that case
had sought to avoid the chosen forum for the adjudication of the merits,
whereas the plaintiff in Sanko was merely asking the U.S. court to
attach property in order to secure payment of a judgment to be rendered
by the chosen court."'
The district court nevertheless considered
Bremen to be decisive:
[The Bremen] case laid at rest any doubt as to the
appointed a new U.K. distributor, in apparent breach of the contract. See id. at 352-57.
Although a clause in the contract designated Barcelona as the exclusive forum for disputes
between the parties, see id. at 353, Evans Marshall brought suit against Bertola and the new
distributors in the U.K. The suit claimed damages for breach of contract and interference with
contract, and sought an injunction restraining the defendants from marketing Bertola sherry in
the U.K. through channels other than Evans Marshall. The suit also sought an interim
injunction to that effect. See id. at 357. When Bertola moved to have the U.K. proceedings
dismissed on the basis of the forum selection clause, the U.K. trial court refused because it
considered the case to be among the very exceptional ones that a U.K. court should decide on
the merits despite the clause. (The trial court asserted that U.K. courts have a limited discretion
to disregard exclusive choice-of-forum clauses.) The court's reasons for treating the case as
exceptional in this respect were that the substance of the case overwhelmingly concerned
England, that the plaintiff's action against the new U.K. distributor was unquestionably within
the jurisdiction of the U.K. courts, and that Spanish procedure was very much slower and
afforded no form of interlocutory relief. See id. at 359-65. The Court of Appeal affirmed. See
Evans Marshall,[1973] 1 W.LR. 349, 368-86 (Eng. C.A.).
116. 411 F. Supp. 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd without op., 538 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1976).
117. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
118. In fact, the parties in Bremen had agreed that a bond should be posted and available
both in the U.K. and the U.S. See id. at 4 n.3.
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enforceability of such clauses and specifically held that they
were applicable to in rem actions .... What [the Supreme
Court] establish[ed] was a rule of law which entitles
defendants to a dismissal of this1 9action. Such dismissal
makes an attachment unavailable.1
The court's refusal to distinguish between a litigant turning its
back on the chosen forum, on the one hand, and a litigant going outside
that forum for a preliminary attachment, on the other, is regrettable.
The Ninth Circuit took the better view when, in the case of Polar
Shipping Ltd. v. Oriental Shipping Corporation,120 it came to the
opposite conclusion. There, the owner of a ship filed an action in the
U.S. for a maritime attachment of property belonging to the ship's
charterer, claiming breach of the charter agreement. The trial court
vacated its initial grant of a writ of foreign attachment due to the fact
that the charter agreement between the parties contained a clause
designating the courts of England as the exclusive forum.' 2 ' The Court
of Appeals properly reinstated the writ on the ground that, absent an
expression of intent to the contrary, a forum selection clause should not
be construed as automatically precluding22a party from seeking a prejudgment attachment in a different court.
The view expressed in PolarShipping has been the longstanding
position of the U.K. courts. 2 1 In the leading case of Mike Trading &
TransportLtd. v. R. Pagnan& Fratelli(The Lisboa),2 4 a vessel called
The Lisboa, which had broken down en route from Argentina to Italy
with a large cargo of wheat, was towed to Tunisia and from there to its
destination in Italy. The owners of the cargo, liable for large towage
expenses, brought an action in Venice against the vessel's owners and
secured its arrest, disregarding the requirement in the bill of lading that
all legal proceedings be brought in London. The vessel's owners
responded with a suit in London for damages for the unlawful arrest of

119. Sanko, 411 F. Supp. at 286 (citations omitted).
120. 680 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982).
121. See id. at 630.
122. See id. at 633.
123. In the century-plus-old case of Law v. Garrett, [1878] 8 Ch.D. 26 (Eng. C.A.), a
contract between British nationals designated the Commercial Court of St. Petersburg, Russia
(the place of business) as the exclusive forum for disputes under the contract and required a
British court to refer any such dispute to the St. Petersburg court. Nevertheless, the English
Court of Appeal ruled that a British court could appoint a receiver of partnership assets in
Britain and afford other ancillary relief if it could be shown that no adequate relief was
available in Russia.
124. [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 546 (Eng. C.A.).
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The Lisboa in breach of the choice of forum clause, and for a declaration
of non-liability for the towage expenses. They also sought an injunction
restraining the cargo owners from maintaining the ship's arrest. At this
point, the cargo owners began their own proceedings in London on the
merits by bringing an unseaworthiness claim. The Court of Appeal
refused the injunction sought by the shipowners. According to Lord
Denning, the choice of forum clause encompassed only actions to
z5
establish liability and not proceedings brought for security purposes.
Courts of other countries
facing this issue have reached essentially the
26
same conclusion.

125. I am clearly of the opinion that we should not grant an injunction so as to
compel the release of this vessel. I can conceive of some cases where an
injunction might be granted. For instance, if the cargo-owners had no
ground whatever for making any claim against the owners and nevertheless
arrested the ship-this Court might grant an injunction to plevent the
continuance of the arrest .... But when the arrest is made in good faith-for
the purpose of obtaining security for a just demand-then I am of [the]
opinion that the English Courts should not restrain it by injunction, even
though it is said to be in breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause; ... nor
should they award damages for the breach of such a clause. It seems to me
that, by the maritime law of the world, the power of arrest should be, and is,
available to a creditor-exercising it in good faith in respect of a maritime
claim-wherever the ship is found-even though the merits of the dispute
have to be decided by a Court in another country.
Id. at 549-50 (citations omitted).
The other members of the court agreed with the result insofar as it preserved the cargo
owners' access to security. Lord Justice Dunn was emphatic:
The question at the end of the day is whether the arrest of the vessel was so
vexatious and oppressive that the defendants ought to be ordered by
mandatory injunction to release her. It is said on behalf of the plaintiffs that
the effect of not granting the injunction will be to enable the defendants to
take advantage of their breach of the exclusive jurisdiction clause .... But
there are other considerations here. There is no suggestion that the merits
of the defendants' claim will be litigated in the Italian courts. The only
purpose in arresting the vessel was to provide security in the event of the
defendants succeeding in the English proceedings. The arrest of a ship is a
very common and recognized proceeding in all maritime countries. And the
remedy of arrest was not available to the defendants in England because the
vessel was not here, and was only available in Italy.
Id. at 552.
126. For example, French courts are prepared, in proper circumstances, to order
prejudgment attachments in aid of actions pending on the merits abroad, and in several cases
have done so even though the underlying contract had designated the foreign court as the
exclusive forum. See generally Laffitte v. Socidtd les Transitaires Rdunis et Ortoli, CA Paris
Oct. 8, 1964, JOURNAL Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL [J. DR. INT'L ] 1965, 901 (attachment of
French assets of Vietnamese company despite exclusive jurisdiction of Vietnamese courts);
Compagnie de Signaux et d'Entreprises Elctriques v. Socidtd Sorelec, Cass. le civ., Dec. 17,
1985, R.C.D.I.P. 1986, 537 (court of place where persons, goods, or rights are situated may
order provisional remedies despite conferral on another state's courts of jurisdiction on the
merits); Socit6 Air Zaire v. Gauthier, CA Paris, le ch., Jan. 31, 1984, Gaz. Pal. 1984, 277,
translatedin 77 INT'L L. REP. 510 (1988) (airline pilots attach aircraft at Paris airport to secure
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The readiness of courts to entertain claims for provisional relief,
even when the courts of another state have exclusive jurisdiction over
the merits of the case, may of course lead parties to draft their forum
selection clauses so as to exclude such recourse. There would appear to
be no reason in principle why parties should not be able to do so,
provided they arrive at that understanding fairly and freely. That being
so, the question of whether a forum selection clause excludes access to
the courts of other jurisdictions for ancillary relief, as well as for
principal relief, is essentially a matter of party intention. In one French
case,' 2 7 the parties were found to have had precisely that intention.
In urging a U.S. court to attach local assets in aid of foreign
judicial proceedings despite a clause designating the foreign forum as
exclusive, a litigant would be advised to invoke as precedent U.S. cases
authorizing the attachment of local assets in aid of foreign arbitral
proceedings. The leading case is probably still CarolinaPower & Light
Co. v. Uranex.28 There, a federal district court in California upheld a
buyer's right to attach ex parte a wholly unrelated debt owed to the
seller by a California corporation, notwithstanding the fact that the
dispute between buyer and seller was subject to arbitration and that an
arbitration was in fact underway. 129 The court concluded that this
exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction was justified because the seller had
property in California, the presence of that property there was not

future judgment of Zaire court on pilots' compensation claims against airline, notwithstanding
jurisdiction of Zaire courts on the merits); COLLINS HAGUE LECTURES, supranote 65; Lawrence
Collins, ProvisionalMeasures,the Conflict of Laws andthe Brussels Convention, 1 Y.B. EUR.
L. 249 (1981); Peter F. Schlosser, CoordinatedTransnationalInteraction in Civil Litigation
andArbitration,12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 150 (1990); Douglas Reichert, ProvisionalRemedies in
InternationalLitigation: A Comprehensive Bibliography, 19 INT'L L. 1429 (1985); Campbell
McLachlan, TransnationalApplications of Mareva Injunctionsand Anton Piller Orders, 36
INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 669 (1987).
127. See Compagnie de Signaux et d'Entreprises l 1ctriques v. Socidtd Sorelec, Cass. le
civ., Dec. 17, 1985, R.C.D.I.P. 1986, 539:
Admittedly, when there is urgency or when the security of persons or goods
is at risk, a French court has jurisdiction to order any protective measures
required, even in the presence of a clause conferring on a foreign court
jurisdiction over the merits of the dispute. But here, the lower court found
that the parties, who were free to contract respecting their rights, had agreed
to submit all requests to the Libyan courts, even requests for orders of a
provisional nature.
128. 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
129. The court required, however, that the buyer file an action directed to the underlying
merits within 30 days in a court with personal jurisdiction over the seller. Id. at 1049. This
aspect of the decision is quite controversial, because the underlying merits had properly been
submitted to an arbitral tribunal in accordance with the parties' prior agreement. Only an action
not addressed to the underlying merits, therefore, would have been proper to bring in ajudicial
forum.
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"merely fortuitous," and California was in any event not an
inconvenient forum in which to litigate the limited issues arising from
the attachment. 3
Although there is certainly authority to the
contrary,' 3 1 the Uranex case seems to reflect the prevailing view.132 Not
surprisingly, the British courts, too, acknowledge circumstances in
which they may justifiably grant a measure of provisional 1relief
in aid
33
of an arbitration being conducted in a foreign jurisdiction.

130. The Court ruled:
[A] fair reading of... Shaffer v. Heitner, requires that the application of
notions of "fair play and substantial justice" include consideration of both
the jeopardy to plaintiffs ultimate recovery and the limited nature of the
jurisdiction sought, that is, jurisdiction merely to order the attachment and
not to adjudicate the underlying merits of the controversies.... [W]here the
facts show that the presence of defendant's property within the state is not
merely fortuitous, and that the attaching jurisdiction is not an inconvenient
arena for defendant to litigate the limited issues arising from the attachment,
assumption of limited jurisdiction to issue the attachment pending litigation
in another forum would be constitutionally permissible.
Id. at 1048. Of course, significantly more would have been required to support the exercise of
in personamjurisdiction over the seller in California.
131. See generallyMcCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT S.p.A., 501 F.2d 1032 (3d Cir.
1974); Metropolitan World Tanker Corp. v. P.N. Pertambangan Minjakdangas Bumi Nasional,
427 F. Supp. 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. Ruebsamen, 531 N.Y.S.2d
547 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A. 442 N.E.2d 1239 (N.Y.
1982).
132. In accord is the case of Andros CompaniaMaritima,S.A. v. Andre & Cie., S.A., 430
F. Supp. 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (U.S. court's retention of jurisdiction under the Federal
Arbitration Act to maintain maritime attachment of defendant's property within the district,
pending arbitration in London, is not inconsistent with U.N. Convention on Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards). Uranex and Andros CompaniaMaritima thus treat
cases providing for arbitration abroad as no different, with respect to the availability of
provisional relief from a U.S. court pending arbitration, than cases providing for arbitration in
the U.S. See generallyTeradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43 (1 st Cir. 1986) (injunction
against disposing of assets); Roso-Lino Beverage Distribs., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of
New York, 749 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1984) (injunction); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Bradley, 756 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1985) (account executive enjoined from using firm
records or soliciting clients, thus preserving the status quo pending arbitration); Sauer Getriebe
KG v. White Hydraulics, Inc., 715 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1983)(preliminary injunction barring
defendant from transferring any manufacturing rights pending arbitration); Erving v. Virginia
Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972) (order enjoining basketball player from
playing for any other club pending outcome of the arbitration); Compania de Navigacion y
Financiera Bosnia S.A. v. National Unity Marine Salvage Corp., 457 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (attachment allowed to remain in force while foreign arbitration proceeds). For a
contrary view, see generally Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, 726 F.2d
1286 (8th Cir. 1984).
133. See Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. v. Balfour Realty Constr. Ltd., [1993] App. Cas. 334
(denying relief under the circumstances however). The earlier English cases on the subject are
not entirely consistent. In the case of Marazura Navegacion S.A. v. Oceanus Mutual
UnderwritingAss'n Ltd., [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 283 (Q.B.), the court allowed a party to resort
to provisional judicial relief despite its submission to arbitration on the merits. See also The
Rena K, [1979] 1 Q.B. 377. In Mantovani v.CarapelliS.p.A., [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 375 (Eng.
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The arbitration analogy is a highly persuasive one. If the courts of
country Y are willing, at least in some circumstances, to intervene for
purposes of provisional relief in cases that the parties have committed
to non-judicial (i.e. arbitral) dispute resolution, they should be similarly
willing to intervene to that same limited extent in cases that the parties
have committed to adjudication on the merits in the courts of country X.
The only reason for drawing a distinction would be that the resolution
of international disputes in arbitral fora is more deserving of support
from national courts than the resolution of international disputes in the
courts of other countries. That would seem to be a dubious proposition.
C.

Other Ways of Preserving the Status Quo in Aid of Foreign
Litigation

As noted in Part II of this article,134 there are ways other than the
pre-judgment attachment of assets by which courts may usefully
preserve the status quo pending the outcome of litigation. Precisely
because protective measures in transnational litigation implicate
persons, property, or conduct in other countries, litigants may need the
assistance of local courts in these countries in order to ensure that such
measures are effective. The willingness of local courts to furnish such
assistance is the subject of this section.
Curiously, U.S. courts have not often been asked to issue orders in
support of the status quo in foreign country litigation, and their
receptiveness to requests of this kind therefore cannot reliably be
gauged. Only in one area of the law does federal legislation expressly
authorize the courts to furnish provisional relief ancillary to foreign
judicial proceedings. Section 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
authorizes the bankruptcy courts to order any "appropriate relief' in
connection with foreign bankruptcy proceedings, provided those
proceedings (a) afford just treatment for all claimants, (b) protect U.S.
claimholders against prejudice and inconvenience, and (c) distribute
proceeds substantially in accordance with the American bankruptcy law
principles.1 35 Clearly, such "appropriate relief' includes the prejudgment attachment of assets, but it may also extend further, as the

C.A.), however, the Court of Appeal deemed an arbitration clause to be broad enough to rule
out resort to any judicial forum, even for the limited purpose of provisional relief in the form
of a sequestration of assets.
134. See notes 66-81 supra and accompanying text.
135. See Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), codifiedat 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1994).
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case of In re LineasAereas de Nicaragua'36 illustrates. There, a trustee
appointed under Nicaraguan law to administer the assets of a
Nicaraguan airline sought an order for the turnover of all of the airline's
property located in the United States, as well as an injunction restraining
the conduct of any litigation in the U.S. against the airline or its
property. The U.S. bankruptcy court not only ordered that all of the
airline's U.S. property be turned over to the trustee (albeit on condition
that it be applied primarily to satisfy debts owed to U.S. creditors), but
also enjoined the bringing of any
new legal actions in U.S. courts
137
property.
its
or
debtor
the
against
Even before enactment of Section 304, U.S. courts had explored
ways of supporting foreign bankruptcy proceedings. The leading case
was Clarkson Co., Ltd. v. Shaheen, 38 in which a Canadian trustee in
bankruptcy brought an action in federal district court in New York to
obtain records located in the New York offices, or held by the New
York corporate officers, of bankrupt Canadian companies. The
preliminary injunction granted by the district court required the New
York officers not only to turn over the records, but also to refrain from
disposing of any corporate property over which they had or might come
to have control. The Court of Appeals affirmed, upholding both the
lower court's
power to issue such an order and the appropriateness of
139
order.
the
Enactment of Section 304 has served more broadly to reinforce the
willingness and capacity of courts to assist foreign bankruptcy
proceedings so as to enhance their effectiveness. A good illustration is

136. See 10 B.R. 790 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
137. While the court did not require the suspension or discontinuance of actions that had
already been instituted, it did prohibit the litigants in those actions from seeking to enforce any
such judgments without a prior order of the U.S. bankruptcy court.
But see In re Toga Mfg. Ltd., 28 B.R. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983), where the court
denied a petition by the bankruptcy trustee of a Canadian company for an injunction restraining
all of the company's creditors from bringing or continuing actions against the company or its
assets. The court found that the Canadian law would not distribute the estate's assets in
substantial accordance with the relevant U.S. law standard and that comity did not require that
action in U.S. courts be restrained. "We find that comity requires that [the U.S. creditor's]
claim remain in the Michigan and United States courts, there to be fully litigated .... This
Court must protect United States citizens' claims against foreign judgments inconsistent with
this country's well-defined and accepted policies." Id. at 170.
138. 544 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1976).
139. The Court of Appeals thought that it would contravene the doctrine of comity not to
recognize the Canadian bankruptcy proceedings. See id. at 632.
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CunardSteamship Co. Ltd. v. Salen Reefer Services AB. 4 ° In that case,
the Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court order vacating an
attachment of the New York assets of a Swedish corporation on the
ground that a Swedish court had declared the company bankrupt and
had issued a stay of actions by the company's creditors. The court
emphasized that the principles of Swedish bankruptcy law were not
dissimilar to those of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and that recognition of
the Swedish bankruptcy proceedings would not offend any overriding
U.S. law or public policy; it also found that Cunard would not be
prejudiced or treated unjustly if it were required to participate in the
Swedish bankruptcy proceedings. 4 ' The comity displayed by U.S.
courts in the bankruptcy field is actually quite surprising in one respect.
While any ancillary relief that U.S. courts might order will most likely
have been solicited (or at least favored) by the foreign liquidator or
trustee, the decisions do not suggest that the courts necessarily solicit
the views of the foreign court itself on the appropriateness of their
contemplated intervention. 42 Their failure to do so would be
questionable.

140. 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985). For a related case, and similar result, see generally
Victrix S.S. Co., S.A. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1987). In Victrix, the
court actually awarded costs and attorneys fees for the wrongful attachment of local property
in disregard of an ongoing foreign bankruptcy proceeding. For a decision awarding damages
as well as costs and fees under these circumstances, see generally Rashi Textiles, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Rhomberg Textil G.m.b.H. of Austria, 857 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
141. The court rejected Cunard's claim that proof of reciprocity by the Swedish courts was
necessary before recognition could be given to the Swedish proceedings. It also rejected the
argument that a foreign bankruptcy tribunal must have inpersonamjurisdiction over a creditor
before the creditor could be required to resort to the tribunal. See CunardSteamship, 773 F.2d
at 458, 460.
For similar exercises of comity under the bankruptcy laws, see generally In re Koreag,
Controle et Revision S.A., 961 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1992); Productos Camic, S.A. v. Central
American Beef& Seafood Trading Co., 621 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1980); In re Rubin, 160 B.R.
269 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Gercke, 122 B.R. 621 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1991); In re Axona
Int'l Credit & Commerce Ltd., 88 B.R. 597 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Lines, 81 B.R. 267
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Gee, 53 B.R. 891 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); Angulo v. Kedzep
Ltd., 29 B.R. 417 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1983); In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
142. Not surprisingly, foreign bankruptcy actions are the type of foreign litigation to which
U.S. courts are also most likely to show deference by declining to exercise their jurisdiction
over related disputes. In the case of Cornfeld v. Investors Overseas Services, Ltd., 471 F. Supp.
1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affd mem., 614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1979), a former officer and director
of a Canadian corporation brought an indemnity action against the corporation in U.S. district
court to recover litigation expenses incurred in service to the corporation. The court declined
to entertain the suit because the company was then involved in liquidation proceedings in a
Canadian court, and the court saw no reason why that the plaintiff could not adequately protect
its rights in Canada. See id. The court reached this result despite the fact that the plaintiff was
a New York citizen and that the indemnification contract contained a clause providing for the
application of New York law. See id.
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The bankruptcy cases naturally raise the question of whether U.S.
courts should also afford provisional relief in aid of other kinds of
actions before foreign courts. Although the aims of bankruptcy law are
particularly well served by a policy favoring international judicial
assistance, nothing requires that such a policy be limited to that field.
As noted, Article 24 of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions-which
cover virtually all civil and commercial litigation in the courts of the
contracting states-expressly allow (and presumably encourage) a court
lacking jurisdiction over the merits of a case to entertain a request for
provisional relief pending the outcome of proceedings in the competent
court. 143 This is suggestive of the room that remains for the future
development of transnational provisional relief in U.S. courts.
D.

Enforcing a ForeignCourt'sProvisionalRemedies

In many of the cases discussed thus far, the courts of two or more
nations were competing, or seen to be competing, in the exercise of
judicial authority over a given dispute. It would be a mistake, however,
to suppose that issues of transnational provisional relief arise only in
that context. A court of country X may have granted a protective
measure in a case that it, and it alone, has an interest in adjudicating.
The measure may then come to the attention of a court of country Y
only because one of the litigants-and possibly even the court of
country X itself-believes that the measure would profit from
enforcement or reinforcement by the courts of another jurisdiction.
In fact, foreign courts very rarely address U.S. courts directly for
assistance in enforcing their orders of provisional relief One such case,
however, is Pacaninsv. Pacanins,'"where a Florida trial court declined
to honor a request from a Venezuelan court to freeze, pending the
outcome of the Venezuelan action, one half of the funds in Florida
belonging to the Venezuelan defendant. The appeals court reversed,
finding that the Venezuelan order, though non-final, was deserving of
enforcement. The court relied on a prior state court decision for the
proposition that compelling public policy considerations sometimes

143. Nothing, of course, prevents a court of a contracting state from exercising discretion
to offer provisional relief even in cases not covered by the Brussels or Lugano Conventions.
See, e.g., Laffitte v. Socidtd les Transitaires Rdunis et Ortoli, CA Paris, Oct. 8 1964, J. DR.
INT'L, 1965, 901. There, a French court appointed a provisional administrator of property in
France belonging to a Vietnamese company, notwithstanding a clause conferring exclusive
jurisdiction on the courts of Vietnam.
144. 650 So.2d 1028 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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require a relaxation of the general rule against enforcing the non-final
orders of foreign courts." 5
In the more usual scenario, a foreign court issues an order of
provisional relief in aid of its own proceedings, and the litigant in whose
favor that order was issued then asks a U.S. court to enforce it. The
field in which U.S. courts are most commonly asked to enforce the
provisional remedies of foreign courts is family law, and especially
matters of alimony and child support. This is perhaps because such
awards, even if modifiable and thus non-final, typically take the form
of fixed money judgments, 146 thus closely resembling the foreign
country money judgments that U.S. courts are customarily asked to
recognize and enforce.
The case of Wolffv. Wo/f- 47 is a perfect illustration. There, the
plaintiff filed suit against her former husband in a Maryland court to
145. See generally Cardenas v. Solis, 570 So.2d 996 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). Among
the examples of enforcement given in this case were interlocutory decrees ordering payment
of support for spouses and minor children, or ordering collection of a valid debt on behalf of
a creditor.
146. Requests that U.S. courts enforce non-monetary foreign orders of provisional relief
are not, however, unknown in the family law area. For example, a New York court recently
granted enforcement of a foreign court order freezing investment accounts in New York. In the
case, Rohlfing v- Rohlfing (unpublished), a Brazilian court had issued an exparte order in favor
of the wife (plaintiff in the separation and divorce action in Brazil) freezing half of the couple's
$4 million in assets in accounts in New York financial institutions. The New York court
rejected the husband's argument that New York lacked personal jurisdiction over him since it
had no jurisdiction over the marriage and since he had no connections, personal or business,
with New York other than maintenance of the accounts. It effectively asserted in rem
jurisdiction over the assets, noting that the husband offered no evidence to suggest that the
Brazilian procedures were not fair or that the Brazilian court had improperly issued the orders.
See Cerisse Anderson, BrazilianCourt Order Enforced in New York, N.Y.L.J., May 18, 1995,
at 1.
One type of non-monetary foreign provisional order that U.S. courts are particularly
willing to enforce in the family law area is a foreign child custody order. See, e.g., Adamsen
v. Adamsen, 195 A.2d 418, 420-21 (Conn. 1963) (return of child to father who had been
awarded custody by a Norwegian court); Zanzonico v. Neeld, 111 A.2d 772, 774-76 (N.J.
1955) (valid adoption of niece under Italian law makes adoption valid under New Jersey law
for inheritance tax purposes, despite failure to comply with New Jersey requirement that
adopted child reside with adoptive parents for a year prior to adoption hearing); Willson v.
Willson, 55 So.2d 905, 906 (Fla. 1951) (full faith and credit given to Canadian custody decree
awarding custody to paternal grandmother, subject to proof of new conditions that would have
produced a different decree if presented to the Canadian court). But see Fantony v. Fantony,
115 A.2d 610, 613 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1955), modified on other grounds, 122 A.2d 593, 598 (N.J.
1956) (comity denied to foreign custody decree where not based on child's best interest). See
also Sheldon Shapiro, Annotation, ExtraterritorialEffect of ValidAward ofCustody of Child
of DivorcedParentsin Absence of SubstantialChange in Circumstances,35 A.L.R.3d 520 §§
9-10a (1971), and cases cited therein. See generallyDavid Buzard, Note, U.S. Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Country Injunctive and Specific PerformanceDecrees, 20 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 91, 93 (1989).
147. 389 A.2d 413 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978).
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enforce the alimony provisions of an English divorce decree. The trial
court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, chiefly
because Maryland had enacted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgment
Recognition Act. This Act expressly does not cover "judgments for
support in matrimonial or family matters."' 48 The Court of Appeals
reversed. It first found that, while the Act does not requirerecognition
of such judgments, neither does it prohibittheir recognition.'49 It then
proceeded to find the decree worthy of recognition under general
principles of comity. 5 More particularly, it held that Maryland equity
courts may enforce the decree of a court of a foreign state or country,
both as to alimony accrued and to accrue, to the same extent and by the
same means that they enforce decrees of their own:
[O]nce it is determined under principles of comity that a
foreign country decree will be recognized in this State, the
question of enforcement becomes .. .should the equity
courts of this State compel obedience to a valid decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction? We think the answer is yes.
To recognize a foreign country decree as valid, but then to
leave a litigant without a remedy for the enforcement of such
a decree would, in our view, render comity a rather
meaningless concept. 5 '

148. Id.at 415. The lower court also found that it lacked personal jurisdiction. See id. at
414. It appears, however, that the husband had not only been personally served with process
in Maryland, see id. at 415, but was a Maryland resident. The appeals court readily found that
personal jurisdiction was not lacking.
149. "To those foreign money-judgments which are excluded from the scope of the Act,
the legislature simply has not spoken. We do not think this silence can be construed as
evidencing an intent that such judgments never, under any circumstances, be accorded
recognition." Id. at 416.
150. The court, of course, stated that a foreign decree would be denied recognition for lack
of jurisdiction, violation of due process, or offense to the public policy of the state where
recognition is sought. But it held that "a foreign decree is presumed valid until some evidence
to the contrary is presented." Id. at 419.
151. Id.at 420. See also Herczog v. Herczog, 9 Cal. Rptr. 5, 9 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
Not all state courts, however, are prepared to enforce alimony awards of foreign courts when,
under the law of the foreign country, those awards are not considered to be final. See Ogden
v. Ogden, 33 So.2d 870, 874 (Fla. 1947). In Ogden, the court also considered the U.K.
judgment non-final insofar as it purported to restore the wife's conjugal rights. See id. For an
older statement of the view that modifiable awards of support by foreign courts are not worthy
of enforcement, see De Brimont v. Penniman, 7 F. Cas. 309,311 (S.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 3,715).
To the same general effect, in the U.K., see Nouvion v. Freeman, [1889] 15 App. Cas. 1 (P.C.).
In the interstate context, certainly, courts have enforced decrees of courts in other U.S.
states that ordered payment of alimony and child support, even when those decrees are
expressly subject to modification and are thus provisional only. See, e.g., Worthley v.
Worthley, 283 P.2d 19, 24 (Cal. 1955) (sister-state alimony and support obligations are
enforceable even if modifiable, and either party may tender any plea for modification that could
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Even outside the family law sphere, non-final or otherwise
modifiable monetary awards may win recognition and enforcement in
U.S. court,'52 though the risk of non-recognition or non-enforcement is
substantial. 5 3 That risk increases enormously, however, when the
foreign provisional relief takes non-monetary form. 54 By definition,
such relief is not only provisional, but is also "specific" in form and thus
more difficult to police. When a party to an action in a court of country
X wins a non-monetary protective order from that court, and then seeks
to enforce that order in a court of country Y, it is thus apt to run into
difficulties.
The still leading case is Pilkington Brothers P.L.C. v. AFG
Industries Inc. 55
'
Pilkington (a British corporation) had begun
arbitration proceedings in London against AFG (a Delaware
corporation) for breach of the parties' licensing agreement. In
connection with that proceeding, Pilkington applied to a U.K. court for
an interim injunction restraining AFG, without Pilkington's consent,
from copying or communicating to any party materials obtained from
Pilkington under their agreement or from giving third parties access to
the production facilities where operations under the licensing agreement
were performed. Though invited to participate in the hearings in the
U.K. court, AFG did not do so, and the court eventually entered an ex
parte order along the lines Pilkington had requested. Pilkington then
filed an application for provisional relief in federal district court in
Delaware. Rather than asking the U.S. court to devise its own
protective order, however, it merely asked that the court issue a
preliminary injunction "exactly track[ing] the wording" of the U.K.
order. 56 The district court judge declined to grant that relief:

be presented to the courts of the state where the decree was originally rendered). See also
Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald Trautman, Recognition ofForeign Adjudications:A Survey
andA Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1656-58 (1968).
152. See Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313, 1323 (2d Cir.
1973). See also Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Co., Kommanditgesellschaft v. Navimpex Centrala Navala, 29 F.3d 79, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1994) (French court
ruling conferring exequatur on arbitral award constitutes a final foreign country money
judgment for purposes of enforcement in the U.S.).
153. See Scheiner v. Wallace, 832 F. Supp. 687, 693-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (non-final money
judgment by English court is not entitled to be given resjudicataeffect so as to bar action on
the claim in U.S. court). See generally Sheldon Shapiro, Annotation, ValidJudgment ofCourt
of Foreign Countryas Entitled to ExtraterritorialEffect in FederalDistrictCourt, 13 A.L.R.
FED. 208 § 9c (1972).
154. Nevertheless, enforcement of non-monetary foreign provisional orders, whether in the
family law area or not, is not unknown in U.S. courts. See supranote 146, infranote 158.
155. 581 F. Supp. 1039 (D. Del. 1984).
156. See id. at 1042.
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I conclude that principles of international comity do not
require, and in fact militate against, the issuance of a
duplicative order that would interject this Court into the
arbitration dispute now before the English courts and the
English arbitration panel.
Unlike decisions by American courts, those issued by
foreign jurisdictions are not entitled to automatic recognition
or enforcement in the United States ....
In the usual case parties seek enforcement in this country of
foreign money judgments, not injunctive orders. According
to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, however,
the principle of international comity should not be limited to
money judgments .... This Court has no reason to quarrel
with the Restatement's position. Nonetheless, plaintiff is not
entitled to its requested relief.'
The court based its refusal on the fact that, unlike a modifiable
injunction entered after a full adjudication of the merits in the foreign
court (as in custody and divorce decrees),' 58 the modifiable order of the
U.K. court was purely interlocutory and had not been based on a full
consideration of the merits of the underlying dispute. It reasoned:
[R]ather than create a per se rule against recognition and
enforcement of foreign interim injunctions, the Court will
analyze the particular facts of this case under general
principles of international comity ....
On the facts of this case it would be inappropriate to enter
into Pilkington's requested relief. By issuing an identically
worded injunction while arbitration is still proceeding under
the watchful jurisdiction of the English High Court, this
Court would offend, rather than promote, principles of
international comity.
For were this Court to issue
Pilkington's requested relief, it would interfere unnecessarily
in those foreign proceedings-proceedings in which
Pilkington agreed by contract to participate. For example,
upon a future application to this Court for a sanction against
violations of its order, this Court would be compelled to
interpret and apply an injunction which was drafted by the

157. Id. at 1043.
158. U.S. courts have sometimes enforced foreign injunctive orders-even outside the
matrimonial law field-when entered after a full adjudication of the merits in the foreign court.
See, e.g., Belle Island Inv. Co. v. Feingold, 453 So.2d 1143, 114546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), case
dismissed,459 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 1984).

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[35:553

English High Court in furtherance of the High Court's special
role under the English Arbitration Act. This might lead to
inconsistent interpretations and inconsistent enforcement.
Any interpretation of the High Court's order should be made
by that court, not a United States district court. In addition,
the existence of two identical outstanding injunctions could
lead to a race to that courthouse which is perceived by each
party as the more favorable forum. Finally, modifications of
an injunction in one jurisdiction could lead to confusion and
procedural tangles in the other jurisdiction. It is far simpler
to have one court receive all applications for modifications. 15 9
An alternative basis for the district court's refusal was that the
relief sought was unnecessary in any event. In the court's view, the
U.K. order, as it stood, extended to AFG's conduct in the United States,
so that an order
of relief by a U.S. court would in a sense be
"redundant."' 60 The court further assumed that the U.K. court would be
willing to punish any violations of its interim order that were committed
in the United States-through a fine, if not through some form of
specific relief like a sequestration of assets.1 61 The court accordingly
left for another day "the question of whether insufficient enforcement
mechanisms in a foreign jurisdiction of a litigant's choice would ever
a duplicative interim injunction at the
constitute grounds for issuing
62
litigant."'
same
the
of
behest
159. Pilkington, 581 F. Supp. at 1045-46 (footnotes omitted).
The court in Pilkingtonevidently did not doubt its jurisdiction to entertain the request
for provisional relief. Butjurisdiction can sometimes of course be an issue, as illustrated by the
case of InternationalShipping Company, S.A. v. Hydra Offshore, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 146
(S.D.N.Y. 1987). International had begun arbitration in the U.K. against Hydra and others to
enforce a contract for the purchase of a vessel. At International's request, the High Court issued
an injunction restraining Hydra from transferring possession of the vessel. Thereafter,
International brought suit on the same underlying claim in the U.S. and applied for a similar
preliminary injunction. The U.S. court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, and the defendants then moved for the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against
plaintiff's counsel. The court found that it manifestly lacked jurisdiction, whether under (a)
admiralty (since admiralty jurisdiction does not cover breaches of contracts to sell a vessel),
Hydra, 675 F.Supp. at 150-51, (b) diversity jurisdiction (since the presence of aliens on both
sides of the case destroyed diversity), see id. at 152, or (c) the Convention on Recognition and
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards (since the Convention only confers jurisdiction in an action
to compel arbitration or to enforce an arbitral award), see id. at 153-54. It consequently
imposed Rule 11 sanctions.
160. Pilkington, 581 F. Supp. at 1046 n.10.
161. See id. at 1046&n.11.
162. Id. at 1046. For criticism of the Pilkington decision, see Buzard, supra note 146, at
100-02; David L. Underhill, Note, Denying Enforcement of a Foreign Country
Injunction-Solutionor Symptom?: Pilkington Bros. v. AFG Indus., Inc., 17 CoNN. L. REV.
703, 718-19 (1985). For a more favorable account, see Vince Carson, Note, Foreign
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Nevertheless, the principal argument advanced in Pilkington for
denying enforcement of provisional orders issued by a foreign court in
an action before that court on the merits was that such enforcement
would interfere with the foreign court's jurisdiction. In order to
evaluate this argument, one must consider the alternatives that the U.S.
court had open to it. One such alternative (which the court did not
embrace) would be for the courts of country Y categorically to deny
enforcement to all foreign provisional orders. A policy of that sort
would, however, run the obvious risk of systematically frustrating not
only provisional remedies ordered by a court of country X, but also that
court's ultimate judgments. Obviously, worse yet would be a policy of
disregarding the country X proceedings altogether and entertaining the
action on the merits.
Another alternative would be for the courts of country Y to
entertain requests for provisional relief, but to insist that any such relief
take the form of an original protective measure of the court's own
devise. Under this approach, courts would deny requests for
enforcement, as such, of measures ordered by a court of country X.
Doing so presents a different, but no less serious, disadvantage. If the
courts of country Y address de novo the necessity of provisional relief
in a case pending before a court of country X-that is to say, if they
show little or no regard for the latter court's previous determination of
that issue-they risk acting at cross-purposes with and even offending
that court. It is difficult to see how such an approach could be
considered more respectful of the country X court than simply
entertaining an action to enforce that court's order as it stands.
Although Pilkington involved only the enforcement of foreign
provisional relief taking non-monetary form, later decisions have
applied its language broadly as authority for withholding comity from
all non-final foreign judgments. One court specifically cited the case for
the proposition that provisional orders of foreign courts should be
63
denied enforcement even when they take purely monetary form.
Another court cited it as evidence of a general judicial aversion to
basing recognition of a foreign court's provisional orders on
considerations of international comity:
[I]n every case [cited] where the principle of comity was

Judgments, 20 TEx. INT'L L.J. 217, 224-25 (1985).
163. See Mayekawa Mfg. Co. v. Sasaki, 888 P.2d 183, 188-89 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995)
(Japanese holder of promissory note cannot enforce note against a Japanese national residing
in the state since the judgment, though monetary in form and though enforceable in Japan, is
only preliminarily enforceable in the state).
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applied, the foreign court had made some form of binding
decision. The [foreign court here] has not yet taken any
action in the related case before it ....
The principle of
comity is inapplicable in the present stage of this litigation."6
Such reasoning, taken at face value, would lead to a policy of nonenforcement of all non-fmal foreign orders. Even Pilkington did not go
that far.
This is not to say that the courts of country Y invariably should
enforce within their territory all measures of provisional relief ordered
in cases before the courts of country X. This too would be unwise.
Although there appears to be little danger of this in the United States,
one state court has announced a general rule favoring the enforcement
of even interlocutory foreign court orders. In Nahar v. Nahar,165 a
Florida court gave effect (over a vigorous dissent) to the interlocutory
order of an Aruban court determining that Dutch law governed the
disposition of the decedent's Florida bank accounts and ordering that
the accounts be transferred to Aruba for disposition in accordance with
that body of law:
[R]ather than trying to analyze each foreign order on the
basis of whether it is final and entitled to comity, [or] nonfinal [and] not subject to an exception and [thus] not entitled
to comity, or non-final [but] subject to an exception and
entitled to comity, the better approach is to follow the
Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws, approach in its
entirety ....
Consequently, it appears that any foreign decree should be
recognized as a valid judgment, and thus be entitled to comity,
where the parties have been given notice and the opportunity to be
heard, where the foreign court had original jurisdiction and where
the foreign
decree does not offend the public policy of the State of
166
Florida.
It is doubtful whether courts will be able to maintain such a hospitable
policy toward foreign provisional orders when faced with the more
difficult situations that future cases will inevitably bring.

164.
151 (D.
165.
166.

Cliffs-Neddrill Turnkey International-Oranjestad v. MT Rich Duke, 734 F. Supp. 142,
Del. 1990) (footnote omitted).
656 So.2d 225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 228-29.
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Treaty-basedEnforcement of ForeignProvisionalRemedies

Although the United States has not ratified any general convention
on the recognition of final foreign country judgments, it is a party to a
number of specific treaties on judicial assistance that are drafted broadly
enough to encompass mutual enforcement of provisional judicial
remedies. Such conventions may be bilateral or multilateral. The best
example of a multilateral arrangement of this sort is the U.N.
Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotrophic Substances. 67 This Convention requires each state party
to enact measures enabling it to identify, trace, and freeze property
derived from, or used in, drug trafficking and money laundering
offenses. Each party must provide judicial assistance by either initiating
forfeiture proceedings or enforcing foreign forfeiture orders with respect
to such property. 6 ' The U.S. has opted in its implementing legislation
for the former method. 169
The United States is also a party to several bilateral "mutual legal
assistance treaties." The signatory states to these treaties agree, upon
request by the authorities of another signatory state, to freeze assets,
initiate forfeiture actions against local property, repatriate assets, and
enforce forfeiture judgments. The U.K.-U.S. agreement specifically
provides for such forms of assistance in cases of drug trafficking.17
Similarly, a mutual assistance treaty with Switzerland permits the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission to obtain provisional freezes on
7
the suspected proceeds of securities law violations.1 1
Clearly, the treaty initiatives undertaken thus far have been
confined to specific "high-profile" law enforcement problems. Such
initiatives are undoubtedly welcome, but are probably an inadequate
framework for coping with the large volume and diverse nature of
requests for the enforcement of foreign provisional remedies that can be

167. See U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493.
168. See id. art. 5(4)(a)(i) & (ii).
169. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(B) (1994). This section authorizes the seizure and forfeiture
of assets in the U.S. representing the proceeds of drug-related crimes committed abroad.
170. See Agreement Concerning the Investigation of Drug Trafficking Offences and the
Seizure and Forfeiture of Proceeds and Instrumentalities of Drug Trafficking, Feb. 9, 1988,
U.S.-U.K., art. 10, T.I.A.S. No. 11,649. See also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
171. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the United States and
Switzerland, May 25, 1973,27 U.S.T. 2019 (1976). See generally Michael D. Mann, et al., The
Establishment of International Mechanisms for Enforcing Provisional Orders and Final
JudgmentsArisingfrom Securities Law Violations, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 303 (1992).
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expected to reach the courts in the years ahead. The courts have no
choice, in the near term, but to confront these challenges on their own.
IV. PROTECTING AGAINST "INTERFERENCE" BY FOREIGN COURTS

In Part II of this article, I focused on the willingness of the courts
of country X to order provisional relief under circumstances in which
that relief will have important extraterritorial effects in country Y. In
Part III, I examined the "reverse" question of whether, and under what
circumstances, the courts of country Y should be willing to lend their
assistance to the provisional remedies ordered by the courts of country
X in cases pending in country X. As Part II in particular shows, one
must reckon with the possibility that the measures adopted by a court of
country X will provoke a distinctly negative reaction in country Y.
Country Y may have such a reaction for the simple reason that the
measures strike it as "extraterritorial" and possibly even as threatening
its own jurisdiction.
Conflict between countries X and Y over the allegedly
extraterritorial protective measures ordered by the courts of country X
is not at all uncommon and promises to become even less so in the years
ahead. Indeed, conflict may even arise in situations in which a court of
country Y purports to act in "aid" of litigation pending before a court of
country X. Suppose, for example, the court of country X (which is
adjudicating the main action) deems the provisional relief ordered by
the court of country Y-however well-intentioned-to have seriously
prejudged the merits of the case or to be otherwise inopportune.
Inasmuch as country Y's intervention was presumably intended from
the start merely to "support" the proceedings in the court of country X,
the latter court would seem perfectly justified in disregarding it (e.g., in
denying it recognition or enforcement).
As the incidence of
transnational provisional relief grows, one should not be surprised to
find that courts entertaining the merits of a case are prepared to reject
interventions by other courts even when they are presented merely as
"friendly" provisional remedies.
This very scenario has arisen in the context of the European
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments (the Brussels
and Lugano Conventions). As has been seen,172 Articles 24 and 25 of
the Convention authorize courts of the contracting states to make

172. See infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
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provisional relief available in aid of litigation in another contracting
state and, in principle, obligate the latter state to enforce that relief. On
occasion, a court (evidently, in all reported cases, a French court) has
seen fit to order the provisional or "interim" payment of a monetary
claim pending final adjudication of that claim in a court of a cocontracting state. 73 It may be debated whether ordering the provisional
payment of a claim, pending final adjudication, constitutes "prejudging"
the case. Surely, however, it is one thing for the court that is hearing the
main action (and that will eventually decide the case on the merits) to
order provisional payment of the claim, but quite another for the court
of a different jurisdiction to do so. Although the European Court of
Justice has not yet had to decide whether such orders properly constitute
measures of "provisional" relief within the meaning of Article 24,1"4 the

173. See, e.g., Tron v. Socidtd Verkor, T.G.I. Nanterre, Oct. 9, 1978, R.C.D.I.P. 1979, 128,
in which a French court awarded interim damages to a French national against his Belgian
employer, despite a clause vesting exclusive jurisdiction over the merits in a Belgian court. The
court reasoned:
The plaintiff has the right under the labor code to seek provisional judicial
relief, and the judge has the power to prescribe all protective measures that
are called for. Article 24 of the Brussels Convention, drafted in the same
terms, confirms the jurisdiction of the court of Mr. Tron's domicile (lejuge
nature) for these purposes. It is not seriously contested, in connection with
the plaintiffs request for provisional relief, that he is owed relatively
substantial sums of money on account of back salary and paid holidays. The
payment of salary that is indispensable for the plaintiffs ability to live is
obviously a protective measure that must be accorded him. Consequently,
this court may award Mr. Tron an advance of the sums to which he is
entitled on this account, while leaving all other elements of his claim to be
decided by the court that has jurisdiction over the merits.
The ruling was reversed by the Court of Appeal, but only on the ground that, contrary to the
lower court's finding, Mr. Tron's entitlement was seriously contested. Socidt6 Verkor v. Tron,
CA Versailles, June 27, 1979, J. DR. INT'L 1980, 894.
See, in this connection, the case of Diehm v. Sicre, CA Aix-en-Provence, May 4, 1981,
R.C.D.I.P. 1983, 110, in which the court overturned in large part (while sustaining in small part)
an award of interim damages to a French national for claims that arose out of a traffic accident
in Germany and over which the German courts had jurisdiction under the Brussels Convention.
The court evidently found that awarding the plaintiff the "quasi-totality" of her claim would
amount to "circumventing" the jurisdiction of the German courts. See also Socintd Nordstern

v. Eon, CA Rennes, May 20, 1980,

DIGEST OF CAsE-LAW RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN

COMMUNrrmS, 1985,1-24-BI 1; Sahm v. Maechler, CA Colmar, Mar. 5, 1982, DIGEST OF CASELAW RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN COMMuNrrmEs,

1985, 1-24-B II (discussed in

COLLINS

HAGUE LECTURES, supra note 65, at 38 n. 117).
174. On two occasions, the Court of Justice has ruled that a provisional measure ordered
by a French court was not mandatorily enforceable in Germany against German assets, Articles
24 and 25 notwithstanding. In neither of those cases, however, did this result turn on
considerations of extraterritoriality. In one case, it turned on the fact that questions of
matrimonial rights in property fall outside the Convention. See Case 143/78, de Cavel v. de
Cavel, 1979 E.C.R. 1055, 1066-67, [1979] 2 C.M.L.R. 547, 558-59. In the other, it turned on
the fact that the French court order in question had been obtained on an exparte basis. See
Case 125/79, Denilauler v. S.n.c. Couchet Freres, 1980 E.C.R. 1553, 1571. The Denilauer

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[35:553

weight of scholarship clearly rejects that notion,175 and this view seems
correct. In fact, the French courts themselves have on occasion ruled
that the court before which the principal action is pending (or the court
that has exclusive jurisdiction over the case) is the more appropriate
forum for the award
of provisional relief when it takes the form of an
176
interim payment.
If the only issue in such cases was whether the courts of country
X will cooperate in enforcing country Y's orders (for example, upon the
request of the party in whose favor the order was granted), the problem
would not be too serious. But the stakes of the conflict can become
much more weighty, as when the courts of country X, resenting the
intrusions by the courts of country Y, adopt and enforce
countermeasures. Put more concretely, the party adversely affected by

court stated:
Article 24 does not preclude provisional or protective measures ordered in
the State of origin pursuant to adversary proceedings-even though by
default-from being the subject of recognition and an authorization for
enforcement on the conditions laid down in Articles 25 to 49 of the
Convention. On the other hand the conditions imposed by Title III of the
Convention ... are not fulfilled in the case of provisional or protective
measures which are ordered or authorized by a court without the party
against whom they are directed having been summoned to appear and which
are intended to be enforced without prior service on that party. It follows
that this type of judicial decision is not covered by the simplified
enforcement procedure provided for by Title III of the Convention ....
[Thus,] judicial decisions authorizing provisional or protective
measures, which are delivered without the party against which they are
directed having been summoned to appear and which are intended to be
enforced without prior service do not come within the system of recognition
and enforcement provided for by Title III of the Convention.
Id. The U.K. courts have reached the same result in cases involving exparte provisional orders
by courts of Convention states. See E.M.I. Records Ltd. v. Modem Music Karl-Ulrich
Walterbach G.m.b.H., [1992] 1 Q.B. 115.
175. See COLLINS HAGUE LECTURES, supra note 65, at 37-39; PIERRE GOTHOT &
DOMINIQUE HOLLEAUX, LA CONVENTION DE BRUXELLES Du 27 SEPTEMBRE 1968 115-17
(1985); Jean-Mare Bischoff& Andrd Huet, Communautes Europiennes, 109 J. DR. INT'L 942,
946-47 (1982). A recent ruling of the Court of Justice confirms these doubts. See Case C261/90, Reichert v. Dresdner Bank AG, 1992 E.C.R. 1-2149, 1-2184, holding that provisional
or protective measures, within the meaning of Article 24, are measures "intended to preserve
a factual or legal situation so as to safeguard rights the recognition of which is sought elsewhere
from the court having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter." In that case, the Court
ruled that since an action paulienne under French law allows the court to "vary the legal
situation of the assets of the debtor and that of the beneficiary by ordering the revocation as
against the creditor of the disposition effected by the debtor in fraud of the creditor's rights,"
it cannot be considered a provisional or protective measure within the meaning of Article 24.
176. See, e.g., Menegatti v. Socidtd Metallurgica Nava Stefano e Giuseppina, CA Paris,
Nov. 17, 1987, J. DR. INT'L, 1989, 96. Moreover, they consistently refuse to order interim
payments of any kind in the face of an agreement to arbitrate. See COLLINS HAGUE LECTURES,
supra note 65, at 39, and the numerous cases cited therein.
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protective measures ordered by the courts of country Y may actually
succeed in getting a court of country X to "cancel" or "undo" those
measures, or to order some kind of countervailing relief of its own.
The recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Wang 17 7 illustrates this scenario. In June 1988, the SEC filed a civil
complaint in federal district court seeking penalties and recovery of
profits from Wang and Lee, who allegedly engaged in insider trading
and defrauded purchasers and sellers of securities on U.S. exchanges in
violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Lee (a Taiwanese
citizen and resident of Hong Kong) was alleged to have benefited in his
securities dealings from non-public information obtained from Wang,
who had been a financial analyst with the Morgan Stanley & Co.
investment bank. At the SEC's request, the court issued an ex parte
temporary restraining order barring Lee from removing assets from the
U.S.-an order that Lee promptly violated by demanding the release of
funds from his bank's New York branch. Lee never filed an answer in
the action, and the court entered a final order of default enjoining Lee
from transferring (or bringing a legal action to recover) his assets, which
included $12.5 million in an English bank having branch offices in
Hong Kong and New York. When Lee (who had meanwhile instructed
his broker to transfer money to the bank's Hong Kong branch via its
New York branch) then sued the bank in Hong Kong for possession of
these funds, in violation of the district court's anti-suit injunction, the
U.S. district court ordered the bank to deposit the $12.5 million into the
court's registry. The bank complied under protest, and the U.S. court
entered a default judgment that Lee unsuccessfully sought to set aside.
The district court then impressed the funds with a constructive trust in
favor of the defrauded investors and ordered an inquiry into the amount
of actual insider trading profits for purposes of determining Lee's
penalty.
Eventually, the court in the Hong Kong action rendered ajudgment
denying effect to the orders of the U.S. court, including the anti-suit
injunction. It considered those orders to be unworthy of recognition, not
only because they were extraterritorial in reach, but also because they
were "public" in nature:
In the present case [the] SEC, a United States federal agency,
is the sole plaintiff in the New York court proceedings. The
order for disgorgement and the order for penalty are solely
sought by the SEC. No investor or private party has

177. 699 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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intervened in the SEC's statutory enforcement proceedings.
The terms on which the Receiver will hold the disgorged
funds are those to be proposed by [the] SEC and approved by
the court ....
The disgorged offender's funds, it is true, are not paid into
the United States treasury. However, the disgorged funds are
a monetary sum recovered by [the] SEC, in its capacity as a
federal agency, in exercise of its statutory powers forming
part of the enforcement provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act. I am satisfied that the disgorgement proceedings...
amount to "the enforcement of a sanction, power or right at
the instance of the state in its sovereign capacity" [quoting
authority]. If the.., proceedings are not in the narrow sense
the enforcement of a sanction, they are certainly the
enforcement of a public power or right at the instance of the
United States in its sovereign capacity ....
I have already held that the triple penalty provisions form
part of the penal laws of the United States. I further hold that
neither of the New York court orders.., can be invoked by
the Bank in Hong178 Kong, by way of defence to the plaintiffs
*.. summonses.

Notwithstanding its refusal to enforce the orders of the U.S. authorities,
the Hong Kong court was prepared to protect the defrauded investors by
recognizing the
existence under Hong Kong law of a constructive trust
179
in their favor.
At this point, the bank filed an appeal from the U.S. district court
judgment and order, claiming that the district court had effectively
placed it in double jeopardy by creating a duplicate constructive trust
and raising the risk that the bank would have to indemnify the investors
twice, once in each jurisdiction. The British government strongly
supported the bank, complaining that the district court had acted
extraterritorially, in violation of international law, by "seek[ing] to
regulate... relations between a banking company, not of United States
nationality.... and a customer of that Bank in respect of a sum of
money held in accounts in a branch of that Bank in Hong Kong." "The
presence of another branch of the same Bank in the United States," it

178. Nanus Asia Co. v. Standard Chartered Bank, [1990] 1 H.K.L.R. 396, 413-15 (High
Court 1988).
179. The court emphasized that its recognition and enforcement of a constructive trust did
not amount to a direct or indirect enforcement of U.S. penal or other "public" laws. See id. at
419.
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argued, "is immaterial."'' ° The parties settled the case before the Court
of Appeals could decide the appeal and before the Hong Kong court had
issued any order disposing of the constructive trust funds.
The Wang case demonstrates the capacity of transnational
provisional relief to precipitate international judicial warfare; in this
respect, it is not unlike the practice of international anti-suit
injunctions. 8 ' But unlike the international anti-suit injunction, whose
use presumably can be sharply curtailed without prejudice to the
international legal system, transnational provisional relief is
unquestionably here to stay. The challenge will be for national courts
to distinguish between its use and its abuse, and to ensure that when
used, it is used with measure and discretion.
V.

CONCLUSION

Given the variety of scenarios in which issues of transnational
provisional relief may arise, it is scarcely surprising that neither
Congress nor the courts have thus far managed to articulate clear or
consistent policies on this aspect of transnational litigation. With the
exception of the states that are parties to the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions-and, even then, only as to international judicial
cooperation among themselves-most
other countries do not appear to
82
have done much better.
The courts cannot afford to adopt a policy toward transnational
provisional relief that ignores the range of forms that such relief may
take or the range of procedural settings in which it is sought. Some
measures are transnational chiefly by virtue of their effects on persons,
property, or conduct located abroad. Even as to this category,
distinctions must be drawn. Where, for example, the applicant or its
opponent is a foreign national, the transnational element is not in itself
significant enough to justify modifying customary judicial attitudes
toward the grant of provisional relief. In situations where the
transnational element is more substantial, national courts face a more
delicate task. The U.K. experience demonstrates in a general way that

180. Diplomatic Note annexed to the United Kingdom brief to the Court of Appeals.
181. See generally George A. Bermann, The Use ofAnti-Suit Injunctions in International
Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 501 (1989).
182. See David Westin & Peter Chrocziel, Interim ReliefAwarded by U.S. and German
Courts in Supportof ForeignProceedings,28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 723, 737-41 (1990).
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courts need not be paralyzed by the prospect of ordering provisional
relief with extraterritorial effects, but that they should not succumb to
the temptation to order such relief when less drastic (and indeed less
extraterritorial) measures would suffice. U.S. courts do not yet have as
much experience with these problems, but the prospects for putting the
lessons of the U.K. experience into practice appear to be promising.
In the other major scenario of transnational provisional relief, the
court asked to order a protective measure is a court other than the
foreign one in which the main action is pending. In addressing this
scenario, courts should not overstate the difference between requests for
relief in aid of ongoing foreign litigation, on the one hand, and requests
for enforcement of provisional remedies already ordered by foreign
courts in cases pending before them, on the other. The central questions
in either situation are whether the court of country Y has a sufficient
jurisdictional basis for acting in the manner proposed, whether the
litigation in country X truly requires its intervention, and whether the
intervention is a reasonable one given the circumstances of the litigation
in country X and the claim on resources in country Y. After confirming
its jurisdictional basis for acting, therefore, the requested court should
inquire into whether the relief that is sought is indeed necessary, in
some identifiable respect, to ensure the efficacy of the foreign
proceeding (whether by protecting the foreign court's jurisdiction,
assisting in the conduct of its proceedings, supporting the effectiveness
of its likely outcome, or assisting in some other way) and whether
granting it would impose disproportionate costs or other risks on the
jurisdiction in which it sits.
To help satisfy itself on these matters-as well as to promote
international comity more generally-the court of country Y should
normally solicit and consider the views of the court of country X on the
necessity and utility of the protective measure contemplated. This will
often be necessary precisely because requests for ancillary provisional
relief (including enforcement of the main forum's own provisional
remedies) typically come from the parties and not directly from the
foreign court hearing the action. In some cases, the ancillary relief that
is envisaged would be regarded by the foreign court itself as an
interference; it would be well for the court entertaining the request for
relief to know that if it is indeed the case. This is not to suggest that
U.S. courts should under no circumstances entertain a request for
provisional relief in connection with foreign litigation in the absence of
a positive indication by the foreign court, or that a negative indication
on the foreign court's part must in all circumstances be regarded as
conclusive. By the same token, however, there may well be
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circumstances in which U.S. courts should decline to grant relief
ancillary to a foreign judicial proceeding, even though the situation
might ordinarily warrant the issuance of an order and even though the
foreign court has given every indication of welcoming one.
Even in the absence of any clear indication of the forum court's
views on these issues, it may be appropriate for the intervening court to
require that the applicant first exhaust any analogous provisional
remedies that are ordinarily available from the court hearing the main
action and that would be reasonably adequate for the protective
purposes sought to be achieved. Nor should the intervening court be
indifferent to the forum state's policies, if any, on the appropriateness
of litigants resorting to the courts of foreign jurisdictions for purposes
of obtaining provisional relief. The fact remains that provisional relief
has its greatest impact on the court hearing the main action and that
court's assessment of the impact is entitled to serious consideration.
More importantly, U.S. courts called upon to grant provisional
relief ancillary to foreign judicial proceedings should take a more openminded attitude than is reflected in the few decisions that have thus far
been rendered. Issues of transnational provisional relief admittedly do
not lend themselves to simple solutions; indeed it is doubtful, given the
slim number and range of cases that have thus far arisen, that we have
yet seen the full dimensions of the problem. It is already clear,
however, that neither slavish enforcement (or reinforcement) of
provisional remedies ordered by foreign courts in actions pending
before them nor categorical refusal to enforce such remedies is an
appropriate response. The extensive experience of U.S. courts in
entertaining requests for transnational provisional relief in the limited
field of bankruptcy suggests that U.S. courts are capable of making
similarly sound exercises of judgment over a much wider legal
landscape, and that the international legal order would be
correspondingly benefited if they did so.

